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Abstract	
 
We	use	an	extended	version	of	the	well‐established	Crepon,	Duguet	and	Mairesse	model	
(1998)	to	model	the	relationship	between	appropriability	mechanisms,	innovation	and	
firm‐level	 productivity.	 We	 enrich	 this	 model	 in	 several	 ways.	 First,	 we	 consider	
different	 types	 of	 innovation	 spending	 and	 study	 the	 differences	 in	 estimates	 when	
innovation	 spending	 (rather	 than	R&D	 spending)	 is	 used	 to	 predict	 innovation	 in	 the	
CDM	 model.	 Second,	 we	 assume	 that	 a	 firm	 simultaneously	 innovates	 and	 chooses	
among	different	appropriability	methods	(formal	or	informal)	to	protect	the	innovation.	
Finally,	 in	the	third	stage,	we	estimate	the	impact	of	the	innovation	output	conditional	
on	the	choice	of	appropriability	mechanisms	on	firms’	productivity.	We	find	that	firms	
that	 innovate	and	rate	 formal	methods	 for	 the	protection	of	 Intellectual	Property	 (IP)	
highly	are	more	productive	than	other	firms,	but	that	the	same	does	not	hold	in	the	case	
of	informal	methods	for	the	protection	of	a	firm’s	IP,	except	possibly	for	large	firms	as	
opposed	 to	 SMEs.	We	 also	 find	 that	 this	 result	 is	 strongest	 for	 firms	 in	 the	 services,	
trade,	and	utility	sectors,	and	negative	in	the	manufacturing	sector.		
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1.	INTRODUCTION		
Innovation	 is	 the	engine	of	 long‐run	growth.	However	 innovation	does	not	 flourish	 in	
isolation	 but	 it	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 interactions	 among	 firms,	 policy‐makers	 and	 the	
institutions	 that	shape	 the	environment	where	 firms	 innovate.	Among	 the	 institutions	
that	 matter	 for	 innovation,	 the	 legal	 system	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 intellectual	
property	has	a	prominent	role	and	unsurprisingly,	its	design	has	been	one	of	the	main	
concerns	of	the	innovation	and	technology	policy	across	the	world.	A	welfare‐enhancing	
legal	 system	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 intellectual	 property	 has	 to	 balance	 different	
requirements	 (Nordhaus,	1969).	On	 the	one	hand,	 it	has	 to	allow	 inventors	 to	benefit	
from	 their	 investment	 by	 letting	 them	 appropriate	 some	 of	 the	 returns	 from	 their	
inventions.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 has	 to	 do	 so	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 the	 social	 costs	
associated	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 (possibly	 short‐term)	 legal	 monopoly	 are	 minimised	
while	not	hindering	the	diffusion	of	the	newly	created	knowledge	across	the	economic	
system	(Levin	et	al.,	1987;	Gallini,	2002;	Kultti	et	al.,	2006).		
Most	 of	 the	 policy	 and	 academic	 debate	 around	 the	 benefits	 and	 the	 social	 costs	
associated	 to	 the	 existence	of	 a	 legal	 system	 for	 the	protection	of	 a	 firm’s	 intellectual	
property	 (IP)	 has	 revolved	 around	 patents	 (Boldrin	 and	 Levine,	 2013;	Moser,	 2013).	
This	emphasis	on	patents	is	mostly	due	to	data	availability	and	economic	saliency	(given	
the	economic	distortions	that	the	award	of	a	patent	generates	in	the	economic	system).	
In	reality,	patents	are	just	one	of	the	instruments	that	the	legal	system	offers	to	firms	to	
protect	their	intellectual	property.	Mechanisms	to	appropriate	the	returns	to	knowledge	
assets	are	 typically	 classified	 into	 formal	 (patents,	 trademarks,	 copyrights,	 and	design	
rights)	 and	 informal	 methods	 (secrecy,	 lead	 time,	 confidentiality	 agreements,	 and	
complexity).		
Survey	evidence	finds	that	firms	do	not	consider	patents	the	most	effective	mechanism	
to	 protect	 their	 intellectual	 property.	 In	 two	 seminal	 papers	 in	 this	 area,	 Levin	 et	 al.	
(1987)	and	Cohen	et	al.	 (2000)	 find	 that	 lead	time	and	secrecy	are	considered	by	U.S.	
manufacturing	firms	to	be	more	effective	than	patents	for	the	protection	of	their	IP.	In	
addition,	 Cohen	 et	al.	 (2000)	 find	 that	 patents	 are	mostly	 used	 for	 strategic	 reasons.	
More	 recent	 data	 sourced	 from	 the	 UK	 Community	 Innovation	 Survey	 show	 that	 the	
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share	of	firms	patenting	among	those	reporting	that	they	have	innovated	is	around	4%	
(Hall	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Also,	 Howells	 et	 al.	 (2003)	 find	 that	 formal	 and	 informal	
appropriability	 mechanisms	 are	 used	 simultaneously	 by	 firms	 and	 that	 the	 type	 of	
innovation	matters	for	the	choice.		
The	 implication	 is	 that	 any	 analysis	 on	 the	 relationship	 among	 appropriability	
mechanisms,	 innovation	 and	 firm‐level	 performance	 needs	 to	 take	 into	 account	 two	
main	 issues:	 a)	 formal	 and	 informal	 appropriability	 mechanisms	 are	 not	 mutually	
exclusive	 and	 firms	 can	 use	 both	 at	 the	 same	 time;	 and	 b)	 the	 choice	 of	 the	
appropriability	mechanisms	(be	 it	 formal	or	 informal)	 is	correlated	with	 the	 type	and	
quality	of	innovation.	Thus	understanding	how	IP	protection	can	foster	innovation	and	
boost	firm’s	performance	needs	to	control	somehow	for	the	type	of	innovations	as	well	
as	their	quality	where	possible.		
This	 paper	 builds	 upon	 the	 existing	 literature	 on	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 appropriability	
mechanisms	and	its	impact	on	firm‐level	innovation	and	productivity.	At	the	same	time,	
it	innovates	on	the	existing	literature	in	two	ways.	First,	we	explicitly	model	the	choice	
that	firms	make	between	formal	and	informal	appropriability	mechanisms	and	we	test	
the	extent	to	which	this	choice	 is	correlated	to	the	type	of	 innovation.	Second,	we	test	
the	possibility	 that	 the	magnitude	of	 the	 correlation	between	 firms’	performance	 and	
the	choice	of	the	appropriability	mechanism	is	conditional	on	the	type	of	innovation.		
Modelling	the	relationship	between	firm	productivity,	innovation	and	the	choice	of	the	
appropriability	mechanism	presents	a	set	of	 challenges.	First,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	define	
theoretically	 the	 channels	 through	 which	 the	 choice	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	
appropriability	 mechanisms	 can	 affect	 performance.	 Our	 key	 assumption	 is	 that	 the	
association	between	performance	and	appropriability	mechanisms	is	conditional	on	the	
type	 of	 innovation	 the	 IP	method	 is	 protecting.	 In	 other	words,	 firms	 that	 are	 in	 the	
process	of	developing	new	products	or	new	processes	simultaneously	decide	whether	
to	 use	 formal	 or	 formal	 IP	methods	 to	 protect	 the	 intellectual	 capital	 attached	 to	 the	
invention.	 Once	 the	 new	 products	 or/and	 processes	 are	 introduced	 we	 can	 observe	
changes	on	 firms’	performance	 that	do	not	 stem	directly	 from	 the	choice	of	 a	 specific	
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appropriability	mechanism	but	rather	from	the	combination	of	the	innovation	and	how	
it	is	protected.		
Second,	 it	could	be	argued	that	 there	may	be	a	reverse	causality	relationship	between	
innovation	output	and	productivity;	 indeed	 it	well	may	be	that	more	productive	 firms	
may	opt	for	formal	IP	methods	(in	particular,	patents)	as	this	may	for	example	signal	its	
profitability	 and	 long‐term	 viability	 to	 investors	 (e.g.,	 Czarnitzki	 et	 al.	 2014).	 To	
partially	address	this	issue,	we	assume	that	the	production	of	innovation	and	the	choice	
of	 the	 IP	 methods	 precede	 temporally	 the	 output.	 If	 so,	 we	 can	 then	 model	 the	
relationship	 among	 appropriability,	 innovation	 and	 productivity	 in	 a	 semi‐sequential	
fashion:	in	other	words,	we	model	the	relationship	between	innovation	and	the	choice	
among	 the	several	methods	 for	 the	protection	of	 the	 IP	simultaneously	assuming	 that	
the	 variables	 are	 correlated	 with	 each	 other	 conditional	 on	 observable	 firm	
characteristics;	then	we	model	the	productivity	gains	a	firm	may	experience	conditional	
on	the	previous‐period	innovation	output	and	the	choice	of	the	IP	method.	This	does	not	
solve	 the	 problem	of	 simultaneity	 induced	 by	permanent	unobservable	 differences	 in	
innovative	capacity	and	output	across	firms,	but	it	does	mitigate	any	bias	arising	from	
transitory	effects.	Given	the	fact	that	the	panel	structure	of	our	data	is	very	sparse,	we	
cannot	do	much	better	than	this.		
Empirically,	 we	 use	 an	 extended	 version	 of	 the	 well‐established	 Crepon,	 Duguet	 and	
Mairesse	model	(1998)	(CDM,	henceforth)	which	connects	the	production	of	innovation	
to	the	firm	performance.	Our	version	of	the	model	is	based	on	the	model	in	Griffith	et	al.	
(2006).	We	enrich	this	model	in	several	ways.	In	the	CDM	model,	R&D	is	an	input	to	the	
innovation	production	process	and	the	knowledge	produced	by	innovation	becomes	an	
input	to	the	production	function.	In	the	first	stage	of	the	model,	the	decision	to	invest	in	
R&D	 and	 the	 R&D	 intensity	 are	 estimated	 simultaneously	 while	 the	 innovation	
production	 functions	and	 the	productivity	equations	are	estimated	sequentially	 in	 the	
second	 and	 third	 stages	 respectively.	 Our	 specification	 differs	 from	 the	 usual	 CDM	
model	 in	 several	 respects.	 First,	 we	 do	 not	 focus	 only	 on	 R&D	 spending	 but	we	 also	
consider	 different	 types	 of	 innovation	 spending	 and	 we	 study	 the	 differences	 in	
estimates	 when	 innovation	 spending	 rather	 than	 R&D	 spending	 is	 used	 to	 predict	
innovation	in	the	CDM	model.	Second,	we	assume	that	a	firm	simultaneously	innovates	
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and	chooses	between	the	different	appropriability	methods	(either	formal	or	 informal	
IP	methods,	both	methods,	or	possibly	nothing	at	all).	Finally,	we	estimate	the	impact	on	
firms’	performance	of	the	innovation	output	conditional	on	the	choice	of	IP	method(s)	
by	estimating	a	production	function	augmented	by	a	measure	of	the	lagged	innovation	
output	derived	from	the	second	stage	and	conditional	on	the	IP	choice.	
Our	analysis	is	based	on	a	new	firm‐level	dataset	for	the	UK	that	combines	information	
from	 a	 range	 of	 different	 sources.	We	 merge	 the	 three	 waves	 of	 the	 UK	 Community	
Innovation	survey	(CIS	3,	4	and	5)	to	the	Annual	Respondents	Database	(ARD2)	and	the	
Business	Strategy	Database	(BSD),	which	have	information	on	firms’	inputs	and	outputs.	
To	reduce	endogeneity	bias	 in	the	production	function,	we	use	productivity	data	 from	
the	year	after	the	innovation	and	R&D	data.	That	is,	we	merge	each	wave	of	the	CIS	with	
the	subsequent	period	ARD	information	(i.e.	CIS	4	firms	are	matched	to	the	2005	ARD	
and	so	on).	The	resulting	dataset	contains	not	only	detailed	information	on	firms’	self‐
reported	innovation	activities	from	the	UK	Community	Innovation	Survey	(CIS),	but	also	
on	measures	of	firm	inputs	and	outputs	that	allow	to	compute	estimate	the	augmented	
production	function	at	firm‐level.		
Only	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 our	 sample	 of	 firms	 is	 in	 manufacturing,	 with	 the	 remainder	 in	
services,	 utilities,	 trade,	 and	 construction.	 Innovation	 in	 these	 sectors	 may	 be	 quite	
different	 from	 innovation	 in	 manufacturing,	 relying	 less	 on	 R&D	 and	 more	 on	 the	
introduction	 of	 new	 IT‐based	 processes.	 Our	 data	 source	 provides	 information	 on	 a	
broader	 definition	 of	 innovation	 spending	 of	 which	 only	 about	 20	 per	 cent	 is	 R&D	
spending.		
Our	key	result	is	that	firms	who	innovate	and	rate	formal	IP	highly	are	more	productive	
than	 other	 firms,	 but	 this	 does	 not	 hold	 for	 informal	 IP	 by	 itself,	 except	 possibly	 for	
larger	firms.	We	also	find	that	this	result	is	strongest	for	firms	in	the	services,	trade,	and	
utility	sectors,	and	negative	in	the	manufacturing	sector.		
The	paper	is	organised	in	the	following	way.	Section	2	briefly	summarises	the	relevant	
empirical	 literature.	 Section	 3	 illustrates	 the	 empirical	 framework	 we	 use	 for	 our	
analysis.	The	structure	and	the	content	of	the	datasets	are	presented	in	Section	4	and	in	
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an	appendix,	while	the	results	are	shown	in	Sections	5	and	6.	Finally	some	conclusions	
are	presented	in	Section	7.	
2.	APPROPRIABILITY	MECHANISMS	AND	FIRM‐LEVEL	PERFORMANCE:	
A	SURVEY	
The	purpose	of	this	section	is	to	 illustrate	briefly	the	 literature	on	the	choice	between	
the	 appropriability	 mechanisms	 and	 their	 influence	 on	 innovation	 and	 firm‐level	
performance.	In	doing	so	we	will	identify	the	main	themes	and	outcomes	emerging	from	
this	 literature	 and	 these	 will	 then	 drive	 our	 empirical	 analysis.	 As	 mentioned	 in	 the	
Introduction,	 the	 innovation	 literature	 distinguishes	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	
appropriability	mechanisms	which	differ	 in	the	nature	of	the	 legal	rights	a	 firm	has	 in	
case	of	violation	of	its	intellectual	property.	In	spite	of	the	emphasis	on	patents	or	more	
generally	on	 formal	mechanisms,	 firms	do	use	both	 formal	and	 informal	mechanisms.	
This	point	was	first	made	by	Levin	et	al.	(1987)	and	Cohen	et	al.	(2000).	They	were	both	
concerned	with	 the	extent	 to	which	 firms	 in	different	 industries	 chose	 legal	 and	non‐
legal	 methods	 to	 secure	 returns	 from	 innovation	 and	 their	 findings	 were	 broadly	
consistent.	 On	 average,	 patents	 are	 not	 the	 most	 important	 mechanism	 to	 protect	 a	
firm’s	IP	while	secrecy	and	lead	time	are.	However,	this	is	not	entirely	true	for	product	
innovations	 and	 for	 industries	 that	 are	 specialized	 in	 the	 production	 of	 “discrete”	
products	 where	 patents	 are	 still	 the	 favourite	 instrument	 to	 secure	 returns	 from	
innovation.	These	 two	 seminal	papers	have	been	 followed	by	a	 raft	 of	 similar	 studies	
which	have	 confirmed	 that	 the	preference	 for	 informal	appropriability	mechanisms	 is	
not	 limited	 to	 US	 firms	 only.	 Arundel	 (2001)	 focused	 on	 the	 relative	 effectiveness	 of	
patents	 and	 secrecy	 using	 the	 CIS	 I	 survey	 for	 six	 EU	 countries	 and	 found	 that	 firms	
systematically	 regard	 lead‐time	 and	 secrecy	 as	more	 important	ways	 to	 protect	 their	
intellectual	property	than	patents.3	Laursen	and	Salter	(2005)	found	that	the	first	mover	
advantage	 is	 the	preferred	appropriability	mechanism	for	UK	 firms	while	Amara	et	al.	
																																																								
3	 In	 this	 survey,	 over	50%	of	 firms	 ranked	 lead‐time	as	 the	most	 important	mechanism	 to	appropriate	
returns	 to	 their	 innovation	and	nearly	17%	regarded	secrecy	as	 the	most	 important	way	 to	protect	an	
innovation.	In	contrast,	only	about	10%	regarded	patents	as	the	most	effective	way	to	secure	returns.		
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(2008)	confirmed	these	findings	for	Canadian	firms	from	the	KIBS	sectors	but	they	also	
found	 that	patents	and	secrecy	 tend	to	be	complementary,	 in	 line	with	what	has	been	
suggested	by	other	authors	(see	for	instance	Howells	et	al.,	2003).		
Why	do	firms	use	a	variety	of	appropriability	mechanisms?	Teece	(1986)	points	out	that	
the	strength	of	the	legal	mechanisms	for	the	protection	of	a	firm’s	intellectual	property,	
the	 nature	 of	 the	 technology	 and	 the	 type	 of	 knowledge	 embodied	 in	 the	 technology	
may	influence	the	nature	of	the	appropriability	regime	in	an	industry	and	in	turn,	this	
may	drive	the	choice	between	the	different	appropriability	mechanisms.	So	innovating	
firms	may	differ	in	their	choice	of	the	appropriability	mechanisms	and	these	differences	
may	 be	 due	 to	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 knowledge	 embodied	 in	 the	 invention	 (for	
instance,	 if	the	knowledge	attached	to	an	invention	is	tacit,	 then	again	secrecy	may	be	
sufficient	 to	 protect	 an	 invention),	 the	 type	 of	 innovation	 (process	 innovation	 can	 be	
protected	by	secrecy	as	reverse	engineering	may	not	be	of	much	help	 in	 these	cases),	
industry‐	and	firm‐level	characteristics	(size,	 innovation	strategies	etc.).	Thanks	to	the	
volume	 of	 papers	 which	 have	 tried	 to	 understand	 why	 firms	 may	 find	 some	
appropriability	 mechanisms	 more	 effective	 than	 others,	 we	 do	 have	 now	 a	 good	
understanding	 of	 how	 each	 of	 the	 above	 factors	 influences	 the	 firms’	 choice.	 For	
instance,	 we	 know	 that	 the	 size	 of	 the	 firm	matters.	 Arundel	 (2001)	 finds	 that	 large	
firms	are	more	likely	to	patent	than	small	firms,	likely	because	of	the	patent	application	
costs.4	Innovation	and	general	business	strategies	are	also	found	to	influence	the	choice	
among	 appropriability	 mechanisms.	 For	 instance,	 Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen	 and	
Puumalainen	 (2007)	 find	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 pursuing	
short‐term	value	and	the	use	of	lead	time	in	a	sample	of	299	Finnish	firms.	Hanel	(2005)	
also	 finds	 that	 firms	whose	 strategy	 focuses	 on	 the	 development	 of	 new	markets	 are	
likely	 to	 use	 formal	 appropriability	 mechanisms	 like	 trademarks	 (but	 not	 patents)	
although	export	strategies	are	not	associated	with	the	use	of	IPR.	Also,	 involvement	in	
R&D	cooperation	has	been	found	to	increase	the	value	of	patenting	because	patents	help	
																																																								
4 Arundel (2001) also states that this result may be counterintuitive as theoretically small firms may find patents 
more valuable than large firms as they would help them to enter an industry. Although this is clearly true for a 
small subset of small firms (those relying on external financing such as venture capital), it may not be true for 
small firms in general.  
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to	 define	 the	 property	 rights	 among	 the	 members	 of	 the	 consortium	 (Cohen,	 et	 al.	
2000).5		
We	do	know	 that	 the	 type	of	 industry	 the	 firms	operates	 in	may	 influence	 the	 choice	
between	different	appropriability	mechanisms.	Some	studies	have	 focused	on	services	
(rather	than	manufacturing)	and	they	all	suggest	that	most	service	firms	do	not	use	any	
IP	 at	 all	 and	 among	 those	 which	 do,	 trademarks	 and	 copyrights	 (i.e.	 formal	
appropriability	mechanisms)	are	the	most	used	appropriability	mechanisms.	Among	the	
informal	mechanisms,	 lock‐in	 of	 customers,	 suppliers	 and/or	workers	 is	 preferred	 to	
secrecy	(Mairesse	and	Mohnen,	2003;	Hipp	and	Herstatt,	2006).		
The	 typology	 of	 the	 products	 also	matters.	 Cohen	 et	al.	 (2000)	 divide	manufacturing	
industries	 into	 discrete	 and	 complex	 products	 industries	 and	 suggest	 that	 in	 discrete	
products	 industries	patents	are	 typically	used	more	often	 than	secrecy.	 In	contrast,	 in	
complex	products	industries	it	 is	often	much	easier	to	invent	around	technologies	and	
this	 reduces	 the	 incentive	 to	 patent	 and	 may	 lead	 complex‐product	 firms	 to	 rely	 on	
alternative	 appropriability	 mechanisms	 (like	 lead	 time,	 for	 instance).	 Also,	 product	
innovations	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 patented	 than	 process	 innovations	 (Harabi,	 1995;	
Hanel,	2005).	This	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	the	benefit	offered	by	a	patent	in	the	
case	 of	 process	 innovations	 (where	 reverse	 engineering	 cannot	 be	 used)	 may	 be	
minimal.	 The	 stage	 of	 development	 of	 an	 innovation	 has	 a	 bearing	 on	 the	 choice	
between	 formal	 and	 informal	mechanisms	 For	 instance,	 firms	may	 use	 secrecy	when	
developing	a	new	technology	but	then	apply	for	a	patent	when	the	new	product	is	about	
to	be	commercialised	(Hussinger,	2006).		
Very	 little	 is	 known	 about	 the	 influence	 that	 the	 preference	 for	 secrecy	 (or	 informal	
appropriability	 mechanisms,	 in	 general)	 may	 have	 on	 some	 indicators	 of	 firm’s	
performance.	A	 few	 studies	have	 focused	on	 financial	 or	 innovation	performance	 and	
have	 tried	 to	 relate	 them	 to	 the	 firms’	 preferences	 for	 the	 different	 appropriability	
mechanisms.	Hussinger	(2006)	 focuses	on	the	percentage	of	sales	and	the	 impact	that	
																																																								
5 However, Leiponen and Byma (2009) find that small firms cooperating in innovation with competitors prefer 
lead time to patents to protect their IP. 
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the	choice	between	patents	and	secrecy	has	on	it.	Her	analysis	is	based	on	a	data‐set	of	
626	German	manufacturing	 firms	and	she	 finds	a	 strong	positive	 correlation	between	
patents	and	 sales	of	new	products,	whereas	 there	 is	no	correlation	 for	 secrecy.	Hanel	
(2008)	 focused	 on	 profits	 among	 Canadian	 manufacturing	 firms,	 modelling	 the	
relationship	between	profits	and	the	choice	of	the	preferred	IP	mechanism(s)	in	a	two‐
stage	model	where	the	first	stage	estimates	the	propensity	of	innovative	firms	to	use	IP	
mechanisms	and	the	second	stage	estimates	the	impact	of	this	choice	on	the	profits.	The	
main	 conclusion	 is	 that	 firms	 that	use	 formal	 appropriability	mechanisms	 increase	or	
maintain	their	profit.	Similarly,	Hall	et	al.	(2013)	find	that	firms’	preference	for	patents	
is	 positively	 associated	 to	 innovative	 performance	 measured	 as	 turnover	 due	 to	
innovation	although	there	 is	 little	relationship	between	patenting	and	other	measures	
of	performance	(like	employment	growth).	These	findings	seem	to	suggest	that	patents	
are	used	to	protect	product	innovations	which	have	a	direct	bearing	on	profits	and	sales	
while	 secrecy	 may	 be	 rather	 used	 either	 for	 process	 innovation	 or	 for	 early‐stage	
inventions	that	will	be	commercialised	later	on.		
The	studies	reviewed	here	focus	mainly	on	manufacturing	where	formal	IP	in	the	form	
of	patents	is	traditionally	associated	to	innovation.	Services	can	be	different:	innovation	
among	service	firms	may	not	be	technology‐related	and	there	might	be	no	benefit	from	
using	 formal	 IP	 protection.6	 So	we	 could	 potentially	 observe	 innovative	 service	 firms	
which	 are	 more	 productive	 than	 their	 non‐innovative	 counterparts	 but	 at	 the	 same	
time,	 showing	 a	 preference	 for	 secrecy.	 A	 recent	 study	 by	Masayuki	 (2014)	 presents	
some	circumstantial	evidence	suggesting	that	higher	productivity	among	services	may	
be	correlated	with	the	preference	for	informal	appropriability	mechanisms	(proxied	by	
their	trade	secrets	holdings)	among	innovative	Japanese	service	firms.		
In	summary,	this	short	survey	confirms	the	importance	of	the	informal	appropriability	
mechanisms	and	 their	bearing	on	 firm‐level	productivity	and	profits.	 It	 also	 identifies	
some	 characteristics	 of	 the	 firms,	 of	 the	 technology	 and	 of	 the	 industries	 which	 are	
																																																								
6 Clearly this is an evolving area. To the extent that software and business method patenting are available, some 
parts of the service sector may indeed benefit from formal IP. In addition, copyright and trademark protection 
may be very useful in some services.  
11 
 
associated	to	the	choice	of	the	appropriability	regime	and	which	we	will	employ	for	our	
empirical	analysis.		
3.	EMPIRICAL	FRAMEWORK	
As	mentioned	in	the	Introduction,	this	section	is	devoted	to	the	description	of	the	model	
we	use	 for	the	empirical	analysis.	Our	model	captures	 the	original	 flavour	of	 the	CDM	
model	in	that	it	attempts	to	model	the	relationship	between	the	firm’s	decision	to	invest	
in	 R&D	 and	 the	way	 this	 is	 exploited	 to	 generate	 innovation,	 first	 and	 improve	 their	
performance,	afterwards.	Unlike	the	original	CDM	model,	we	model	explicitly	the	choice	
between	formal	and	informal	appropriability	mechanisms.	We	assume	that	this	choice	
is	 made	 simultaneously	 with	 innovation	 success	 as	 firms’	 perception	 about	 the	
quality/type	 of	 innovation	 is	 correlated	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 preferred	 appropriability	
mechanism.	
One	of	the	well	established	limitations	of	the	CDM	model	is	that	it	does	not	allow	one	to	
establish	 causal	 relationships	 but	 instead	 describes	 correlations	 because	 the	 system	
does	not	generally	permit	 the	 identification	of	 true	 instruments.	Our	model	obviously	
shares	these	limitations:	indeed,	in	specifying	our	empirical	model,	we	do	impose	some	
exclusion	 restrictions	 based	 on	 assumptions	 which	 are	 plausible	 from	 an	 economic	
standpoint	 but	 they	 are	 not	 testable.	 The	 implication	 is	 that	 we	 cannot	 necessarily	
predict	the	consequences	of	a	change	in	IP	behaviour	on	firms’	productivity.		
We	have	 tried	 to	mitigate	 these	drawbacks	 in	 two	ways:	 first,	 our	 empirical	model	 is	
based	 on	 a	 set	 of	 exclusion	 restrictions	which	 are	 grounded	 in	 economic	 theory.	 For	
instance,	we	 have	 assumed	 that	 the	 decision	 to	 invest	 in	 innovation	 and	 the	 amount	
invested	depend	on	 the	general	 IP	environment	 in	 the	 sector,	but	 that	 the	 firm’s	own	
rating	 of	 IP	 is	 jointly	 determined	 with	 its	 innovation	 success	 or	 failure.	 And	 when	
specifying	 the	 innovation	 production	 functions	 and	 the	 equations	 which	 govern	 the	
preference	for	the	appropriability	mechanisms,	we	assume	that	the	goals	of	innovation	
are	associated	 to	 the	production	of	 innovation	and	not	 to	 the	 choice	 of	 IP	protection.	
Second,	 we	 have	 used	 productivity	 data	 in	 the	 year	 following	 the	 last	 year	 in	 each	
innovation	 survey,	 so	 that	 the	 innovation	 expenditure	 and	 innovation	 performance	
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precedes	 the	 performance	 measure,	 although	 we	 are	 aware	 that	 this	 is	 a	 weak	
identification	strategy	and	does	not	fully	solve	the	endogeneity	problem.		
Our	 empirical	 model	 is	 formalised	 in	 three	 stages.	 In	 Stage	 1,	 we	 model	 the	 firm’s	
decision	to	invest	in	innovation	as	well	as	the	intensity	of	the	innovation	expenditure.	In	
Stage	2,	we	model	in	a	simultaneous	fashion	the	production	of	innovation	and	the	choice	
of	 the	 appropriability	 mechanism.	 We	 assume	 that	 these	 are	 conditional	 on	 the	
innovation	 expenditure	 and	 are	 affected	 by	 other	 firms’	 characteristics.	 We	 assume	
there	may	be	unobservables	 that	drive	both	the	 firm’s	propensity	to	 innovate	and	the	
choice	 of	 the	 appropriability	mechanism.	 In	 the	 third	 stage,	we	model	 the	 process	 of	
exploitation	 of	 innovation	 by	 estimating	 an	 augmented	 production	 function	where	 in	
line	with	the	CDM	model,	the	innovation	outputs	are	introduced	among	the	regressors	
of	 the	 augmented	 production	 function;	 however	 their	 correlations	 with	 the	 firm’s	
measure	of	output	are	 conditional	on	 the	 choice	of	 the	appropriability	mechanism.	 In	
other	words,	we	allow	for	the	fact	that	the	correlation	between	output	and	innovation	
output	varies	with	the	preferred	appropriability	mechanism.	This	way,	we	capture	the	
extent	to	which	the	use	of	a	specific	appropriability	mechanism	is	associated	to	a	more	
innovative	and	productive	firm.	We	will	now	analyse	each	stage	in	more	detail.		
Stage	1:	 the	 first	 two	equations	model	 simultaneously	 the	 firm’s	decision	 to	 invest	 in	
innovation	 and	 the	 intensity	 of	 its	 innovation	 expenditure	 using	 a	 sample	 selection	
model.	 Traditionally,	 the	 CDM	model	 focus	 on	 the	 decision	 to	 invest	 in	 R&D	 and	 its	
intensity	but	we	have	decided	to	expand	the	model	in	such	a	way	that	different	types	of	
innovation	 expenditures	 are	 modelled	 in	 this	 stage	 with	 the	 R&D	 expenditure	 being	
included	 as	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 innovation	 expenditure.	 The	 decision	 to	 invest	 in	
innovation	is	governed	by	the	following	equations:	
																									
0* if 0
0* if 1


iii
iii
wisis
wisis

 					 Ni ,....,1 													 (1)	
Where	 *is is	an	unobservable	latent	variable	whose	value	determines	whether	the	firm	
invests	in	innovation,	is	is	an	observed	indicator	which	equals	zero	for	firms	that	do	not	
invest	 in	 innovation	and	one	 for	 innovation‐investing	 firms.	w	 is	 a	vector	of	 variables	
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explaining	the	investment	decision,	α	is	a	vector	of	parameters	to	be	estimated	and	εi	is	
an	error	term,	assumed	to	be	normally	distributed.		
Conditional	 on	 firms	 investing	 in	 innovation,	 we	 observe	 the	 amount	 of	 resources	
invested	in	 innovation	(modelled	here	as	 innovation	expenditure	intensity	–	 isi	 i.e.	the	
logarithm	of	the	innovation	expenditure	per	employee):	
			
0 if            0
0 if 


ii
iiii
isisi
isezisi  	 																									(2)	
where	zi	is	a	vector	of	variables	affecting	the	innovation	expenditure	intensity,	β	is	the	
vector	 of	 coefficients	 and	 ei	 is	 an	 error	 term.	 Assuming	 that	 the	 two	 error	 terms	 are	
distributed	 as	 a	 bivariate	 normal	 with	 zero	 mean,	 variances	 12  and	 2e ,	 and	 a	
correlation	 coefficient	 ρ,	 the	 system	 of	 equations	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 can	 be	 estimated	 as	 a	
generalised	Tobit	model	by	Maximum	Likelihood	estimation.		
Stage	2.	The	second	block	consists	of	a	set	of	innovation	production	functions	and	the	
equations	 which	 describe	 the	 choice	 between	 appropriability	 mechanisms.	 For	 our	
purpose,	we	distinguish	between	two	types	of	binary	innovation	outcomes	(product	and	
process	innovations)	and	between	formal	(patents,	design	and	copyrights)	and	informal	
(secrecy,	 confidentiality	 agreements,	 complexity	 and	 lead	 time)	 appropriability	
mechanisms.	Although	ideally	we	would	like	to	include	product	and	process	innovations	
in	the	same	model,	we	found	that	their	fitted	values	after	instrumenting	were	so	highly	
correlated	 that	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 obtain	 sensible	 results	 when	 both	 variables	 were	
included	in	an	equation.	Therefore,	we	chose	to	analyse	one	type	of	innovation	at	a	time	
(product	or	process)	due	to	lack	of	identifying	power.		
We	 assume	 that	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 appropriability	 mechanism	 and	 the	 innovation	
production	 functions	 are	 correlated	 conditional	 on	 their	 predictor	 variables	 and	
therefore	 we	 estimate	 them	 using	 a	 multivariate	 model.	 Formally,	 the	 multivariate	
model	is	specified	as	a	system	of	three	equations:		
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where	Φ	(.,	Σ)	 is	 the	multivariate	normal	distribution,	 isi*	 is	 the	predicted	value	of	the	
innovation	 expenditure	 intensity	 (controlling	 to	 some	 extent	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
investment	 in	 innovation	 is	 endogenous	 to	 the	 production	 of	 innovation),	 the	 Xs	 are	
vectors	of	variables	that	affect	 firms’	propensity	 to	 innovate	and	their	choice	between	
formal	and	informal	appropriability	mechanisms,	and	ds	and	dt	are	 industry	and	wave	
dummies.	Each	 type	of	 innovation	output	 (either	new	to	 the	 firm	or	 to	 the	market)	 is	
proxied	by	a	dummy	variable	(INN)	indicating	whether	the	firm	has	introduced	at	least	
one	product/process	innovation	in	the	last	three	years.	The	dependent	variables	of	the	
two	equations	which	model	the	choice	between	the	formal	and	informal	IP	methods	is	
also	measured	 by	 dummies	 variables	 (FIP	 for	 the	 formal	 IP	methods	 and	 IIP	 for	 the	
informal	ones):	each	takes	the	value	of	one	if	the	firm	rated	at	least	one	of	the	relevant	
methods	as	of	medium	or	high	importance	to	the	enterprise.		
We	estimate	(3)	simultaneously	as	a	trivariate	probit	system	using	the	GHK	algorithm	
(Cappellari	and	Jenkins,	2006),	assuming	that	the	three	disturbances	are	correlated.	As	
in	Griffith	et	al.	 (2006),	 the	predicted	values	 from	the	 first	stage	estimation	computed	
for	 all	 firms	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 probability	 that	 their	 innovation	 expenditure	 is	
observed	are	used	to	proxy	innovation	effort	in	the	innovation	production	function.	This	
approach	 assumes	 that	 a	 firm	 that	 reports	 no	 innovation	 expenditure	may	 have	 still	
have	some	informal	expenditure	related	to	innovation	that	is	not	reported.		
Stage	3.	The	augmented	production	function	is	a	standard	Cobb‐Douglas	model	where	
the	 logarithms	 of	 labour	 (l),	 capital	 (k),	 and	 purchased	 goods	 and	 services	 (m)	 are	
inputs	 along	 with	 the	 predicted	 value	 of	 the	 innovation	 outputs	 and	 of	 the	 firm’s	
appropriability	mechanism.	The	basic	 idea	is	that	 firms’	acquired	knowledge	has	been	
codified	into	specific	product	or	process	innovations	captured	in	the	innovation	output	
variables	and	that	these	variables	are	positively	correlated	with	the	firm’s	performance.		
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To	control	for	the	potential	endogeneity	of	the	innovation	output,	we	use	the	predicted	
values	 from	the	 innovation	production	 functions	 (INN*)	 rather	 than	 the	actual	values.	
More	 importantly,	 to	 gauge	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 size	 of	 the	 correlation	 between	
output	 and	 innovation	 output	 varies	 according	 to	 the	 chosen	 appropriability	
mechanism,	we	 interact	 the	 innovation	 output	 indicator	with	 an	 indicator	 taking	 the	
value	 of	 one	 if	 formal/informal	 appropriation	mechanisms	 are	 highly	 rated	 and	 zero	
otherwise.	We	also	include	the	usual	set	of	industry	and	survey	dummies	to	control	for	
unobserved	characteristics	that	affect	the	output	level.		
Formally,	the	augmented	production	function	is	as	follows:	
* * *
1 2 3 4 5i k i l i i i i i i i i
s r i
y a b k b l INN IIP FIP IIP INN FIP INN
d d v
             
   																			(4)	
4. DATA	AND	VARIABLES	
4.1	Data	
The	 dataset	 we	 have	 used	 for	 our	 analysis	 has	 been	 constructed	 by	merging	 several	
databases	 compiled	by	 the	UK	Office	 for	National	 Statistics	 (ONS)	and	made	available	
through	the	SecureLab	at	the	UK	Data	Service	(UKDS).	The	databases	are	the	following:	
the	Business	Structure	Database,	containing	information	about	firms’	demographic,	the	
Annual	Respondents	Database	(ARD)	which	has	information	about	inputs/outputs	and	
the	UK	Community	 Innovation	Survey	 (waves	3,	4,	5,	6	and	7)	which	has	 information	
about	 the	 innovation	 outputs,	 the	 investment	 in	 R&D	 plus	 information	 about	 the	
preferred	appropriability	mechanism.	Appendix	A	has	more	details	about	the	datasets	
and	the	merging	procedure.		
Our	resulting	dataset	is	an	unbalanced	panel	containing	detailed	information	on	firms’	
characteristics,	innovative	activities	over	the	13	years	period,	1998‐2010.	However,	the	
main	 results	 of	 the	 paper	 refer	 to	 the	 period	 1998‐2006	 and	 that	 is	 because	 the	
questions	that	were	asked	about	IP	preferences	changed	in	the	CIS	6	and	7:	firms	were	
asked	only	about	use	of	formal	IP	methods	(rather	than	importance)	and	no	questions	
on	informal	methods	were	included.		
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As	 this	 paper	 is	 concerned	 with	 firm	 characteristics	 and	 behaviour	 that	 is	 captured	
mainly	in	the	CIS,	we	focus	on	the	sample	of	firms	surveyed	by	the	CIS	and	we	drop	all	
firms	from	the	integrated	dataset	that	have	not	been	sampled	in	at	least	one	of	the	CIS	
waves.	This	means	that	we	use	the	BSD	and	ARD2	only	to	enrich	the	dataset	available	
from	the	CIS.	Each	CIS	refers	to	several	years	(CIS	3	to	1998‐2000,	CIS	4	to	2002‐2004,	
CIS	5	 to	2004‐2006,	CIS	6	 to	2006‐2008,	 and	CIS	7	 to	2008‐2010)	with	2001	being	a	
missing	year.	We	linked	each	wave	of	the	CIS	with	the	next	period	ARD2	(i.e.	CIS	4	firms	
are	matched	 to	 the	 2005	ARD2	 and	 so	 on)	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 simultaneity	 problems	
between	our	innovation,	appropriability	and	productivity	measures.	Note	that	because	a	
new	sample	of	firms	is	drawn	for	each	CIS	(in	principle),	there	is	relatively	little	overlap	
among	the	surveys	and	the	average	number	of	observations	per	firm	is	about	1.3.	7	This	
means	 that	 panel	 data	 estimation	 that	 controls	 for	 fixed	 firm	 effects	 is	 essentially	
infeasible.	
One	problem	that	arises	in	combining	these	datasets	is	the	identification	of	the	relevant	
sampling	unit.	The	ARD2	is	apparently	sampled	at	the	reporting	unit	level	(which	may	
not	 coincide	with	 the	 firm	 in	 the	 case	of	multi‐unit	 firms),	where	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 a	
reporting	 unit	 may	 belong	 to	 a	 larger	 enterprise,	 although	 most	 of	 the	 enterprises	
consist	of	a	single	reporting	unit.	 In	principle,	 the	UK	CIS	 is	sampled	at	 the	enterprise	
level.	Thus	for	multi‐establishment	enterprises,	there	is	some	ambiguity	about	whether	
we	have	the	full	complement	of	data	from	the	ARD2.	Fortunately	this	problem	will	affect	
relatively	few	firms	in	our	sample.	
Table	A1	in	the	appendix	gives	a	quick	overview	of	the	main	characteristics	of	the	basic	
dataset.	 The	 interesting	 feature	 of	 these	 data	 is	 that	 there	 is	 not	 too	much	 variation	
across	 the	 different	 CIS	 waves	 and	 this	 suggests	 that	 most	 of	 the	 variation	 is	 cross‐
sectional.	There	are	a	total	of	68,112	observations	in	the	combined	CIS	3‐7	surveys,	of	
which	48,107	match	to	the	ARD.	About	half	of	these	either	were	missing	industry,	were	
in	the	primary	industries	or	in	service	sectors	that	were	not	covered	by	all	 the	CIS,	or	
																																																								
7 In fact, the CIS 5 survey was based on the same stratified sample as the CIS 4 survey, so there is slightly more 
overlap than implied by drawing a new sample each year.  
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were	 non‐profits	 or	 government	 firms.8	 We	 also	 lose	 an	 additional	 ~10,000	
observations	 due	 to	 missing	 values	 in	 some	 of	 the	 key	 variables,	 or	 due	 to	 sparse	
coverage	 in	 certain	 3‐digit	 industries.	 The	 resulting	 sample	 contains	 10,850	
observations	on	7,255	firms	and	the	sample	for	CIS3,4,5	contains	7,144	observations	on	
5,684	firms	(or	enterprises).	
4.2	Variables	
In	the	empirical	implementation	of	the	structural	model	outlined	in	Section	2,	we	have	
followed	the	existing	empirical	literature	on	the	determinants	of	the	investment	in	R&D	
(and	 in	other	 types	of	 innovation	expenditure)	and	of	 the	production	of	 innovation	 in	
the	CDM	model.		
Stage	1.	We	assume	that	the	 industry‐level	appropriability	environment	can	 influence	
the	 amount	 of	 innovation	 expenditure	 undertaken	 by	 firms	 (although	 the	 firm’s	 own	
innovation	success	affects	its	choice	of	IP	directly).	This	assumption	is	reasonable	as	we	
would	expect	firms	to	invest	more	in	R&D	(or	any	other	type	of	innovation	expenditure)	
if	the	industry	environment	is	such	that	they	can	appropriate	most	of	the	returns	from	
their	 investment	 (Arrow,	1962).	As	 in	Griffith	et	al.	 (2006),	 the	variables	 that	 capture	
the	 industry	 environment	 with	 respect	 to	 appropriability	 are	 defined	 as	 binary	
variables	equal	to	one	if	the	firm	rates	any	one	of	the	formal	(informal)	IP	methods	as	of	
high	 or	 medium	 importance.	 They	 are	 then	 averaged	 over	 3‐digit	 industry.	 We	 use	
industry	rather	 than	firm	level	 information	because	 in	the	second	stage	we	model	 the	
firm’s	own	choice	of	IP	simultaneously	with	its	innovation	success.	
Additional	controls	 include	the	 firm’s	propensity	to	export	(here	proxied	by	a	dummy	
variable	taking	the	value	of	one	if	the	firms	has	exports)	and	whether	the	firm	is	foreign‐
owned.	The	first	variable	captures	the	notion	that	exporting	firms	may	be	more	willing	
to	invest	in	R&D	(or	any	other	innovation	spending)	as	the	competition	and	the	learning	
effect	of	exporting	should	enhance	its	innovative	effort	(Crespi	and	Zuniga,	2012).	The	
second	variable	controls	 for	 the	possibility	 that	 foreign	firms	may	be	more	 innovative	
																																																								
8 The industries deleted were the two-digit sectors (SIC 2007) 1-9 and 80-99.  
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(and	 therefore	 more	 willing	 to	 spend	 more	 in	 R&D)	 than	 national	 firms	 potentially	
because	of	 their	 superior	management	practices	 and	human	 capital	 (Girma	and	Gorg,	
2007;	Kumar	and	Aggarwal,	2012).	Additional	 controls	 include	 size	 (measured	by	 the	
log	 of	 the	 number	 of	 employees)	 and	 age	 (measured	 by	 the	 log	 of	 the	 age).	 The	
expectation	 is	 that	 larger	 firms	may	 be	more	 inclined	 to	 invest	 in	 innovation	 as	 it	 is	
easier	 for	 them	 to	 spread	 the	 fixed	 costs	 of	 the	 investment	 in	 innovation	 than	 for	
smaller	firms	(Cohen	and	Levin,	1989;	Cohen	and	Klepper,	1996).	Equally,	the	empirical	
literature	 suggests	 that	 older	 firms	 tend	 to	 invest	 more	 in	 R&D	 than	 younger	 ones	
because	of	 the	need	 for	 specialist	 skills	 that	younger	 firms	may	 lack	 (see	 for	 instance	
Zahra	 et	 al.,	 2005),	 although	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 new	 entrants	 in	 technology	 sectors	
actually	 invest	 at	 a	higher	 rate	 in	 the	hope	of	 future	 sales.	Thus	 the	 age	effect	 can	go	
either	way.	
We	 also	 control	 whether	 the	 firm	 has	 a	 cooperative	 arrangement	 with	 another	
organisation	for	innovation	by	introducing	a	dummy	variable	taking	the	value	of	one	for	
those	 firms	 which	 have	 a	 cooperative	 arrangement.	 Several	 authors	 suggest	 that	
collaboration	stimulates	further	innovation	investment	by	allowing	firms	to	share	costs	
and	internalising	knowledge	spillovers	(see	Kamien	et	al.,	1992).	We	also	include	a	set	
of	categorical	variables	indicating	the	intensity	of	use	of	different	information	sources	in	
innovation‐related	activities	(Crespi	and	Zuniga,	2012;	Griffith	et	al.,	2006);	these	take	
the	value	of	1	if	information	from	internal	sources/	customers/	suppliers/	competitors/	
universities	was	of	high	or	medium	importance.	As	in	Griffith	et	al.	(2006),	we	introduce	
demand‐pull	 factors	 (namely	 related	 to	 the	 need	 to	 meet	 regulations	 and	 industry	
standards)	 in	 our	 equations	 which	 are	 proxied	 by	 the	 share	 of	 firms	 in	 the	 3‐digit	
industry	 for	 which	 meeting	 regulations	 or	 standards	 were	 of	 high,	 medium,	 or	 low	
importance	for	innovation	(as	opposed	to	no	importance).9	
We	control	for	industry‐level	perception	of	barriers	to	innovation	due	to	either	financial	
constraints	 or	 uncertain	 demand	 for	 the	 new	 products.	 Several	 papers	 suggest	 that	
financial	 factors	 are	 an	 important	 impediment	 to	R&D	 spending	 (Hall,	 2002;	Hall	 and	
																																																								
9 Note that because we also include 2-digit industry dummies in the regressions, the demand pull effects are 
measured relative to the average for the relevant industry.  
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Lerner,	2010).10	Equally,	 industries	characterised	by	uncertainty	 in	 the	new	products’	
markets	are	characterised	by	low	levels	of	R&D	spending.11	The	average	perception	of	
financial	 constraints	 for	 innovation	 and	 constraints	 due	 to	 market	 risk	 (uncertain	
demand)	 in	 the	 3‐digit	 industry	 are	 each	measured	 as	 the	 average	 of	 the	 qualitative	
indicator	0,1,2,3.	Finally,	we	have	included	25	dummy	variables	for	the	2‐digit	industry	
to	 which	 the	 firm	 belongs,	 and	 2	 dummy	 variables	 for	 the	 CIS	 waves.	 The	 excluded	
industry	is	automobile	manufacturing	and	the	excluded	wave	is	CIS3.		
Stage	2.	The	key	independent	variable	in	Stage	2	(and	appearing	in	all	the	equations	of	
Stage	 2)	 is	 the	 predicted	 value	 of	 the	 log	 of	 the	 innovation	 expenditure	 intensity	
(derived	from	the	first	stage	estimates).	As	mentioned	in	Section	2,	this	way	the	model	
takes	 into	 account	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 innovation	 expenditure	 is	 endogenous	 to	 the	
production	 of	 innovation	 and	 to	 firm’s	 preferences	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 appropriability	
mechanisms.	
The	 innovation	and	appropriability	 equations	 share	 some	 independent	 variables	with	
the	equations	from	Stage	1:	size,	age,	the	dummy	for	cooperation	and	the	dummies	for	
the	 sources	 of	 information.	The	 rationale	 for	 including	 them	among	 the	 regressors	 of	
the	innovation	equations	is	quite	similar	to	the	one	offered	in	the	previous	stage.	Older	
and	 larger	 firms	 are	more	 likely	 to	 innovate	 successfully	 as	 they	 have	 the	 necessary	
experience	 and	 capability	 to	 transform	 their	 innovation	 investment	 in	 innovation	
output.	The	same	argument	applies	to	firms	which	are	in	a	cooperation	agreement	for	
innovation	with	other	organisations.		
As	 for	 the	 appropriability	 equations,	 Arundel	 (2001)	 finds	 that	 large	 firms	 are	more	
likely	to	patent	than	small	 firms	because	of	the	costs	associated	to	the	enforcement	of	
patents.	 Involvement	 in	 inter‐firm	 cooperation	 has	 also	 been	 found	 to	 influence	 the	
choice	 of	 the	 IP	 method.	 Firms	 that	 engage	 in	 cooperative	 arrangements	 may	 be	
																																																								
10 Also, Canepa and Stoneman (2008) report that firms from high tech industries are more likely to report a 
project being abandoned or delayed thanks to financial constraints. 
11 See for instance Tiwari et al. (2007) for a study of how financial constraints interact with market uncertainties 
(among the others) and influence R&D spending. 
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interested	 in	 using	 formal	 IP	 methods	 as	 patents	 would	 help	 them	when	 bargaining	
with	the	other	partners	of	the	research	consortium	(Cohen	et	al.,	2000).	Finally,	the	use	
of	different	types	of	information	sources	can	be	associated	to	the	preference	for	specific	
IP	 methods.	 For	 instance,	 firms	 which	 source	 information	 from	 universities	 may	 be	
more	 likely	 to	 patent	 while	 those	 which	 source	 information	 from	 competitors	 or	
suppliers	may	prefer	to	use	secrecy	or	lead	time	to	protect	their	IP.	
Consistently	with	the	empirical	literature	in	this	area,	we	also	control	for	the	perceived	
financial	 constraints	 (taking	 the	value	of	1	 if	 the	 firm	 is	 constrained	and	0	otherwise)	
and	the	perceived	demand	for	innovation	(taking	the	value	of	1	if	the	firm	considers	the	
demand	 for	 innovation	 too	 uncertain)	 in	 both	 the	 innovation	 and	 the	 appropriability	
equations.	Financially	constrained	 firms	are	 less	 likely	 to	produce	 innovation	while	at	
the	same	time	they	may	prefer	informal	IP	methods	(see	Hall	et	al.,	2013	and	Scellato,	
2007).	Also,	firms	which	face	an	uncertain	demand	for	innovation	may	decide	to	patent	
anyway	because	of	the	real	option	that	patents	generate	(Bloom	and	Van	Reenen,	2002).	
We	also	include	two	indicators	of	demand‐pull	factors	for	innovation:	whether	the	firm	
rated	meeting	 regulations	or	 standards	of	medium	or	high	 importance	 for	 innovation	
(as	 opposed	 to	 no	 or	 low	 importance)	 and	whether	 environmental	 concerns	were	 of	
medium	or	high	 importance	 for	 innovation	(as	opposed	to	no	or	 low	importance).	We	
also	control	for	the	industrial	sectors	as	well	as	the	CIS	wave.		
To	identify	the	equations,	we	assume	that	the	direction	of	innovation	(i.e.	the	reasons	to	
innovate)	 is	 associated	 to	 the	 production	 of	 innovation	 but	 not	 to	 the	 preference	 for	
formal	and/or	 informal	appropriability	methods.	Therefore,	 in	 the	product	 innovation	
equation	we	 introduce	 three	 indicators	of	 the	direction	 for	 innovation:	 increasing	 the	
range	 of	 products,	 expanding	 to	 new	 markets	 or	 increasing	 market	 share,	 and	
improving	the	quality	of	products.	In	the	process	innovation	equation	we	include	three	
indicators	 of	 the	 direction	 of	 innovation:	 improving	 the	 flexibility	 of	 production,	
increasing	 capacity,	 and	 lowering	 unit	 costs.	 We	 assume	 also	 that	 whether	 a	 firm	
prefers	either	of	the	IP	methods	is	related	to	whether	the	innovation	which	is	new	to	the	
market.	 Therefore,	 in	 the	 appropriability	 equations	 only,	 we	 introduce	 a	 dummy	
variable	if	the	firm’s	innovation	is	new	to	the	firm	but	not	the	market.	We	exclude	the	
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foreign	ownership,	exports,	and	the	industry‐level	variables	from	the	equations	in	Stage	
2.	Our	assumption	is	that	these	drive	the	innovation	or	R&D	decision	but	do	not	predict	
innovation	output	once	we	control	for	the	level	of	spending.		
Stage	 3.	 In	 the	 augmented	 production	 function,	 output	 is	 measured	 as	 sales	 while	
labour	 is	measured	by	 the	number	of	employees,	capital	by	 the	 total	stock	of	physical	
capital,	 constructed	 from	 the	 investment	 series	 using	 a	 10%	 depreciation	 rate,	 and	
materials	 by	 purchased	 goods	 and	 services.	 We	 also	 include	 the	 predicted	 value	 of	
innovation	output	from	the	second	stage,	the	formal	and	informal	IP	dummies,	and	their	
interactions	with	innovation	outputs.		
Table	1	gives	descriptive	statistics	for	the	estimation	sample,	for	all	firms,	the	firms	that	
have	 positive	 R&D	 spending,	 and	 the	 larger	 set	 of	 firms	 with	 positive	 innovation	
spending.	The	first	panel	shows	the	medians	and	interquartile	ranges	for	the	continuous	
variables	 and	 the	 second	 panel	 shows	 the	 means	 for	 all	 the	 dummy	 variables.	 The	
median	firm	has	305	employees,	value	added	of	9	million	pounds	sterling,	and	a	capital	
stock	of	5	million	pounds	 sterling.	On	average,	 the	 firms	are	28	years	old	and	25	per	
cent	are	foreign‐owned,	but	48	per	cent	export.	33	per	cent	of	the	firms	have	introduced	
products	 new	 to	 the	 firm	 or	market	 in	 the	 past	 three	 years	 (22	 per	 cent	 new	 to	 the	
market),	and	26	per	cent	have	introduced	a	process	innovation	during	the	same	period	
(7	per	cent	new	to	the	market).	35	per	cent	rate	some	form	of	formal	IP	of	medium	to	
high	importance,	whereas	45	per	cent	rate	informal	IP	of	medium	to	high	importance.	
In	addition	 to	R&D	spending,	which	has	been	well	 studied	 in	 the	past,	 this	paper	also	
looks	 at	 the	 broader	 definition	 of	 innovation	 spending,	 which	 includes	 internal	 and	
external	R&D,	purchase	of	new	capital	equipment	for	 innovation,	purchase	of	external	
knowledge,	 and	 marketing	 and,	 training	 expense	 associated	 with	 the	 introduction	 of	
new	 products	 and	 processes.	 Table	 1	 shows	 that	 the	 total	 of	 this	 spending	 is	
substantially	 larger	than	R&D	alone,	and	that	more	 firms	have	non‐zero	expenditures.	
The	median	innovation	expenditure	per	employee	is	158	thousand	pounds	sterling.	The	
R&D‐doing	firms	are	higher	on	all	the	IP	and	innovation	dimensions.	They	are	also	large,	
and	have	higher	non‐R&D	innovation	expenditure,	with	a	median	that	is	five	times	the	
R&D	median.	When	we	add	the	firms	that	have	other	types	of	innovation	expenditure	to	
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the	R&D‐doing	firms,	the	IP	and	innovation	indicators	generally	fall,	but	are	still	higher	
than	those	for	firms	with	no	innovation	expenditure	at	all.		
Table	2	gives	 some	 information	about	 the	 composition	of	 innovation	spending.	By	 far	
the	 largest	 share	 of	 such	 spending	 is	 for	 the	 acquisition	 of	machinery	 and	 computer	
hardware	and	software,	especially	in	SMEs	and	service	firms.	Internal	R&D	spending	is	a	
relatively	 small	 share	 (less	 than	 20	 per	 cent)	 of	 innovation	 spending,	 although	 it	 is	
somewhat	 more	 important	 for	 manufacturing	 firms.	 This	 confirms	 the	 fact	 that	
innovation	in	firms	is	a	much	broader	concept	than	innovation	associated	with	R&D.	We	
expect	that	process	innovation	and	innovation	in	services	in	particular	to	be	associated	
with	the	acquisition	of	new	equipment	and	software,	rather	than	with	R&D	per	se.		
5.	BASIC	RESULTS	
We	 present	 two	 versions	 of	 our	 estimates	 of	 the	 CDM	 model,	 one	 that	 uses	 R&D	
spending	 as	 the	 innovation	 input	 and	 one	 using	 the	 broader	 definition	 of	 innovation	
spending	 that	 includes	 R&D,	 new	 capital	 equipment,	 and	 training	 and	 marketing	
associated	 with	 innovation.	 Table	 3	 shows	 estimates	 for	 both	 the	 R&D	 and	 the	
innovation	models.	Tables	4a	and	4b	show	the	innovation‐IP	equation	estimates	using	
R&D	as	an	 input,	and	Tables	6a	and	6b	 the	corresponding	estimates	using	 innovation	
spending	as	an	input.	Finally,	Tables	5	and	7	show	the	production	function	estimates	for	
each	model.	 In	 the	next	 two	 subsections	of	 the	paper,	we	discuss	 the	 results	 that	use	
R&D	as	in	input	first,	followed	by	those	using	innovation	spending.		
R&D	spending	
The	 results	 from	 Table	 3	 show	 that	 the	 choice	 of	 a	 sample	 selection	 model	 with	
correlated	 disturbances	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 data:	 the	 correlation	 coefficient	 between	
the	two	equation	disturbances	 is	positive	and	quite	significant.	This	 implies	that	 firms	
which	invest	in	R&D	(even	though	they	are	not	predicted	to)	also	have	higher	R&D	than	
predicted.	 Firms	 in	 industries	 that	 rate	 formal	 appropriability	 mechanisms	 as	 of	
medium	 or	 high	 importance	 do	 invest	more	 in	 R&D,	with	 a	 coefficient	 that	 implies	 a	
doubling	of	R&D	per	employee,	even	in	the	presence	of	two‐digit	sector	dummies.	For	
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informal	 IP	 methods,	 the	 coefficient	 is	 somewhat	 lower,	 but	 the	 confidence	 interval	
overlaps	with	that	of	formal	IP	methods.		
Looking	at	 the	predictor	variables,	 firms	 that	 invest	 in	R&D	are	exporters,	and	 if	 they	
export,	their	R&D	investment	rate	is	about	65	per	cent	higher.	Foreign‐owned	firms	are	
slightly	 less	 likely	 to	 invest	 in	 R&D,	 but	 when	 they	 do,	 they	 have	 a	 higher	 R&D	
investment	 rate,	 other	 things	 equal.	 The	 uses	 of	 different	 sources	 of	 information	 for	
innovation	 are	 generally	 positive	 for	 investing	 R&D	 and	 R&D	 intensity.	 Collaborating	
with	other	organizations	and	firms	has	a	positive	impact	on	doing	R&D	and	its	intensity.	
As	we	control	for	two‐digit	industry,	the	sector‐specific	characteristics	generally	do	not	
matter,	with	 the	exception	of	 the	attitudes	 toward	 IP	protection,	which	has	a	positive	
impact	on	R&D	intensity.		
Tables	 4a	 and	 4b	 focus	 on	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 IP	 methods	 and	 on	 the	 innovation	
production	 function.	 The	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 type	 of	 innovation	 and	 the	 choice	 of	 IP	
methods	 are	 positively	 correlated	 conditional	 on	 the	 observables	 is	 confirmed	by	 the	
data,	with	all	correlations	significantly	positive,	and	ranging	from	0.04	to	0.55;	most	are	
above	0.1.		
In	general,	the	results	for	product	and	process	innovators	are	quite	similar	but	there	are	
some	important	differences.	Firms	rating	some	form	of	IP	highly	are	 larger	firms	with	
high	R&D	intensity	and	are	likely	both	to	rate	demand	uncertainty	large	and	to	consider	
themselves	 financially	 constrained.	 Firms	 that	 are	 imitators	 (that	 is,	 they	 produce	
innovations	 that	 are	 new	 to	 the	 firm	 but	 not	 to	 the	 market)	 rate	 formal	 IP	 of	 less	
importance,	as	we	also	found	in	Hall	et	al.	(2013).	Where	the	source	of	information	for	
innovation	is	suppliers	or	competitors,	firms	tend	to	rate	the	use	of	formal	and	informal	
IP	highly.	However,	when	customers	are	the	main	source	of	information	or	the	source	is	
within	group,	they	are	less	likely	to	consider	formal	IP	mechanisms	as	important,	which	
is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising.	 More	 surprising	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 firms	 collaborating	 for	
innovation	are	less	likely	to	rate	formal	IP	highly.		
Turning	 to	 the	 innovation	equations	 (third	columns	of	Tables	4a	and	4b),	we	observe	
that	product	innovators	have	a	high	predicted	R&D	intensity	from	the	previous	stage	of	
estimation	but	that	process	innovation	appears	to	be	less	driven	by	R&D.	Larger	firms	
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are	more	 likely	 to	 innovate,	but	 innovation	does	not	depend	on	 firm	age.	 Information	
internal	to	the	firm’s	group	is	rated	as	important	for	innovation,	and	information	from	
suppliers	 is	 important	only	 for	process	 innovation.	 It	appears	 that	meeting	regulatory	
requirements	 or	 standards	 reduces	 the	 probability	 of	 innovation,	 and	 that	 reducing	
environmental	 impacts	 and	 improving	 health	 and	 safety	 increases	 the	 probability	 of	
process	innovation.	This	may	be	because	the	results	of	innovative	activities	directed	in	
this	way	are	somewhat	more	predictable.	
The	 estimates	 of	 the	 augmented	 production	 function	 are	 shown	 in	 Table	 5,	 for	 four	
types	of	innovation:	product,	process,	and	new‐to‐the‐market	product	and	process.	The	
coefficients	of	the	usual	production	function	inputs	(labour,	capital,	and	materials)	are	
as	 expected,	 and	 imply	 a	 scale	 coefficient	 slightly	 greater	 than	 unity.	 Few	 of	 the	
innovation	or	IP	coefficients	are	significant,	with	the	exception	of	formal	IP	in	the	case	
of	 process	 innovation.	 However,	 when	 the	 coefficients	 are	 combined	 to	 identify	 the	
interaction	of	innovation	probability	with	IP	preferences,	some	highly	significant	results	
appear:	for	product	innovation,	formal	IP	coupled	with	high	predicted	innovation	raises	
productivity	 by	 about	 12	 per	 cent	 (15	 per	 cent	 for	 new‐to‐the‐market	 innovation),	
whereas	 informal	 IP	 coupled	with	 innovations	 has	 essentially	 no	 impact.	 For	 process	
innovation,	there	are	similar	results,	although	the	precision	is	lower,	especially	for	new‐
to‐the‐market	 process	 innovation.	 The	 conclusion	 is	 that	 innovating	 firms	 that	 rate	
formal	IP	as	important	for	protecting	their	innovations	achieve	a	substantial	gain	in	the	
contribution	of	their	innovations	to	productivity	growth.		
Innovation	spending	
The	 estimates	 for	 the	model	 using	 innovation	 spending	 as	 an	 input	 are	 presented	 in	
Tables	3,	6,	and	7.	Table	3	shows	the	results	for	the	first	stage	(investment	in	innovation	
and	innovation	spending	intensity)	while	Tables	6a	(product)	and	6b	(process)	shows	
the	 results	 for	 the	 two	different	 innovation	production	 functions	and	 the	 choice	of	 IP	
methods.	Finally,	Table	7	presents	the	estimates	of	the	augmented	production	function.	
Table	3	allows	us	to	compare	the	estimates	of	a	generalized	Tobit	model	for	innovation	
spending	to	those	for	R&D	investment	alone.	Note	first	that	there	does	not	seem	to	be	
any	 correlation	 between	 the	 unobserved	 propensity	 to	 spend	 on	 innovation	 and	 its	
25 
 
level,	 conditional	 on	 all	 the	 firm	 characteristics	 in	 the	model,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 R&D	
model.	Otherwise,	the	estimated	coefficients	are	similar	with	a	few	exceptions.	The	most	
important	 is	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 sector’s	 formal	 IP	 importance,	 which	 has	 little	
predictive	 power	 for	 innovation	 spending	 intensity	 and	 strong	 predictive	 power	 for	
R&D.	The	other	significant	differences	are	in	the	information	sources:	information	from	
within	 the	 group	 is	 a	 less	 important	 predictor	 of	 innovation	 spending,	 whereas	
information	from	suppliers	flips	sign	and	is	a	much	more	important	predictor	than	it	is	
for	R&D	intensity.	Both	results	undoubtedly	reflect	the	importance	of	capital	equipment	
spending	 as	 a	 component	 of	 the	 larger	 innovation	 spending	 variable.	 Innovation	 that	
depends	on	the	acquisition	of	new	hardware	and	software	is	less	likely	to	be	influenced	
by	the	importance	of	formal	IP	in	the	sector,	and	more	dependent	on	information	from	
the	suppliers	of	that	equipment.		
Tables	6a	and	6b	show	relatively	few	differences	from	Tables	4a	and	4b.	That	is,	using	
innovation	 spending	 instead	 of	 R&D	 as	 a	 predictor	 of	 the	 preference	 for	 formal	 and	
informal	 IP	 and	 innovation	 makes	 little	 difference	 to	 the	 coefficient	 estimates.	 The	
largest	differences	statistically	are	the	increase	in	the	within	group	information	source	
coefficients	and	the	decrease	in	the	suppliers	information	source	coefficient.	This	may	
reflect	the	changes	in	these	coefficients	in	the	innovation	spending	equations,	and	raises	
some	 concern	 about	 the	 interpretation	 of	 these	 coefficients.	 That	 is,	 stronger	
coefficients	 in	 the	 innovation	 spending	 model	 seem	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	 strengthened	
coefficients	of	the	opposite	sign	in	the	IP‐innovation	probability	model.	Recall	that	the	
latter	model	 includes	the	value	of	R&D	or	innovation	spending	that	is	predicted	based	
partly	on	these	coefficients.		
The	 finding	 that	 there	 are	 few	 large	 differences	 between	 instrumenting	 innovation	
outcomes	 via	 R&D	 spending	 or	 innovation	 spending	 suggests	 that	 the	 choice	 will	
probably	 make	 little	 difference	 to	 the	 predicted	 innovation	 probability	 and	 that	 is	
indeed	 the	 case,	 as	 we	 see	 in	 Table	 7.	 There	 are	 essentially	 no	 differences	 in	 the	
estimates	between	Table	5	 (which	uses	 the	R&D	model)	 and	Table	7	 (which	uses	 the	
innovation	spending	model).	The	conclusion	is	that	 it	makes	no	difference	to	the	CDM	
model	whether	one	uses	R&D	spending	or	innovation	spending	as	the	innovation	input,	
even	though	the	two	variables	are	in	fact	quite	different	for	most	firms.	The	correlation	
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of	the	two	variables	is	about	0.35	and	approximately	half	of	the	firms	with	 innovation	
expenditures	 have	 no	 R&D	 spending.	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	
these	variables	are	being	instrumented,	which	means	that	what	it	really	says	is	that	the	
values	 of	 R&D	 and	 innovation	 spending	 predicted	 by	 size,	 age,	 industry,	 exporting,	
ownership,	 collaborating,	 the	 IP	 and	 regulation	 environment,	 and	 sources	 of	
information	have	 the	same	 impact	on	productivity.	 It	 is	possible	 that	our	 instruments	
are	not	sufficiently	powerful	to	see	a	differential	effect,	although	this	is	a	bit	surprising,	
especially	in	the	case	of	process	innovation,	where	we	might	have	expected	innovation	
spending	to	have	greater	impact	than	R&D.		
6. SIZE	AND	SECTOR	
The	previous	results	showed	that	firms	favouring	formal	IP	to	protect	their	innovations	
have	 a	 productivity	 higher	 by	 10‐20	 percent	 for	 the	 same	 set	 of	 inputs,	 but	 that	
favouring	only	informal	IP	did	not	have	a	similar	impact.	In	this	section	we	examine	how	
this	result	varies	over	firm	size	and	broad	sector.	To	this	end,	we	divide	the	sample	into	
two	 groupings:	 1)	 SMEs,	 defined	 as	 firms	with	 fewer	 than	 250	 employees,	 and	 other	
(large)	firms;	2)	Manufacturing	and	Services,	including	construction,	trade,	utilities,	and	
business	 services.	 The	 full	 R&D	 model	 was	 re‐estimated	 for	 both	 groupings	 and	 a	
summary	of	 the	 results	 for	 the	production	 function	 is	 shown	 in	Tables	8	 (size)	 and	9	
(sector).12	Both	groupings	produced	estimates	with	a	slightly	better	fit	than	the	pooled	
estimates.		
Looking	 at	 Table	 8,	 we	 first	 note	 that	 the	 IP	 variables	 enter	 productivity	 jointly	
significantly	 only	 for	 the	 SMEs,	 but	 not	 for	 the	 larger	 firms.	 However,	 looking	 at	 the	
individual	 coefficients,	 the	 earlier	 results	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 formal	 IP	 for	
productivity	 in	 the	 case	 of	 product	 innovation	 still	 holds	 for	 SMEs;	 equally,	 both	
informal	and	formal	IP	are	important	for	the	productivity	of	both	SMEs	and	large	firms	
in	the	case	of	product	innovation.	The	most	interesting	result	is	that	when	we	split	the	
sample	 like	 this,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 informal	 IP	 protection	 is	much	more	 important	 for	
																																																								
12 We also estimated the full innovation spending model, but as we saw earlier, it makes little difference for the 
productivity equation which model we use, so we do not show these estimates. 
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large	firm	productivity	than	for	SMEs,	which	is	a	somewhat	surprising	result.	It	can	be	
rationalised	in	the	light	of	the	theoretical	model	of	Anton	and	Yao	(2004)	who	suggest	
that	 firms	 may	 be	 inclined	 to	 protect	 very	 valuable	 inventions	 (which	 may	 have	 a	
potential	 large	 impact	on	 their	productivity)	with	 secrecy	 rather	 than	with	patents	 to	
avoid	the	risks	of	potential	disclosure.	That	is,	although	the	use	of	formal	IP	protection	
is	more	prevalent	 among	 large	 firms	 than	among	 small	 firms	 (Hall	 et	 al.	 2013),	 these	
firms	 also	 seem	 to	 find	 informal	 IP	 protection	 somewhat	 more	 useful	 for	 increasing	
their	productivity	than	smaller	firms.	This	may	reflect	the	fact	that	SMEs	have	a	greater	
need	to	access	inputs	external	to	the	firm	and	therefore	need	to	protect	their	knowledge	
more	 formally.	 Unlike	 large	 firms,	 SMEs	may	 lack	 the	 necessary	 financial	 and	 human	
resources	 to	 engage	 in	 internal	R&D	and	 therefore	 they	may	 tend	 to	 rely	 on	 external	
knowledge	created	by	neighbouring	firms	(as	well	as	universities)	(Acs,	Audretsch	and	
Feldman,	1994)	which	makes	necessary	the	use	of	formal	IP	mechanisms.		
Turning	to	the	sector‐specific	estimates	in	Table	9,	we	find	first	that	the	importance	of	
formal	IP	over	informal	IP	for	productivity	is	supported	strongly	for	the	service	sector,	
but	 much	 more	 ambiguously	 for	 the	 manufacturing	 sector,	 where	 informal	 IP	 is	 as	
important	as	formal	IP	and	all	the	impact	is	negative.	It	turns	out	that	this	result	is	due	
primarily	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 high	 probability	 of	 innovation	 in	 that	 sector	 is	 associated	
with	substantially	lower	measured	productivity,	regardless	of	the	firm’s	preference	for	
IP	protection.	Further	exploration	did	not	turn	up	an	explanation	for	this	result.	It	may	
be	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 are	 longer	 lags	 between	 innovative	 activity	 and	
productivity	 in	 this	 sector,	 or	 to	 problems	 in	measuring	 the	 inputs	 to	 productivity	 in	
innovative	firms.		
7.	CONCLUSIONS	
In	 this	 paper	 we	 have	 explored	 the	 estimation	 of	 an	 augmented	 CDM	 model	 that	
includes	 firm	 and	 industry	 ratings	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 various	 forms	 of	 intellectual	
property	protection.	Our	main	assumption	was	that	the	choice	of	a	specific	 IP	method	
does	not	necessarily	affect	a	firm’s	productivity	per	se	but	does	so	through	the	type	of	
innovation.	 Thus	 we	 modelled	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 appropriability	 mechanisms	
simultaneously	with	innovation	success	and	then	included	the	interaction	of	the	choice	
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with	 innovation	 in	 the	 productivity	 equation.	We	 also	 explored	 the	 use	 of	 innovation	
spending	 rather	 than	 R&D	 as	 an	 innovation	 predictor,	 and	 took	 a	 brief	 look	 at	 the	
differences	across	firm	size	and	sector.		
There	are	a	number	of	key	results	from	this	exploration.	First,	we	found	that	firms	who	
innovated	and	rated	formal	 IP	highly	were	more	productive	than	other	firms,	but	that	
the	same	did	not	hold	for	informal	IP	by	itself,	except	possibly	for	large	firms	as	opposed	
to	SMEs.	We	also	found	that	this	result	was	strongest	for	firms	in	the	services,	trade,	and	
utility	 sectors,	 and	 negative	 in	 the	 manufacturing	 sector,	 largely	 due	 to	 the	 negative	
impact	of	predicted	innovation	probability.	
Second,	we	provide	evidence	 that	R&D	spending	 is	 only	 a	 fraction	of	 total	 innovation	
spending,	 especially	 when	 we	 look	 beyond	 the	 manufacturing	 sector.	 However,	 the	
predictive	power	of	the	two	types	of	spending	for	productivity	is	very	similar,	at	 least	
when	we	instrument	the	variables.		
Third,	we	noted	that	in	spite	of	the	previous	result,	there	were	significant	differences	in	
the	 equations	 that	 predict	 R&D	 and	 innovation	 spending.	 R&D	 intensity	 is	 higher	 in	
exporting	firms,	those	in	formal	IP	sectors,	and	firms	obtaining	innovation	information	
from	within	 their	group	and	 from	universities,	whereas	 innovation	spending	 is	higher	
when	suppliers	are	an	 important	 information	source.	This	 contrast	appears	 to	be	one	
between	 the	 traditional	 technology‐intensive	 sectors	 (patenting,	 exporting,	 and	 closer	
to	university	science)	and	innovation	in	sectors	that	rely	on	the	acquisition	of	hardware	
and	software	to	upgrade	and	change	their	processes.		
Our	 study	also	 suffers	 from	a	number	of	 limitations.	Most	 importantly,	we	 found	 that	
predicted	process	and	product	innovation	probabilities	were	so	highly	correlated	that	it	
is	 not	 really	 possible	 to	 tease	 out	 their	 separate	 impact	 in	 the	 same	 productivity	
equation,	 and	we	 chose	 to	 analyse	 them	 separately	 to	 look	 for	 differences.	We	 found	
relatively	 few	 differences,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 a	 clear	 association	 of	 process	
innovation	and	information	from	suppliers.	Second,	the	use	of	an	IP	importance	rating	
as	a	proxy	for	IP	use	is	somewhat	untested,	although	we	know	they	are	related	from	our	
earlier	work	 (Hall	 et	 al.	 2013).	A	 related	problem	 is	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 IP	
preferences	and	 innovation	 is	also	rather	 imprecise,	as	 the	preference	 is	based	on	the	
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general	outlook	of	 the	 firm	and	 the	 innovation(s)	something	 that	may	have	happened	
any	 time	 during	 the	 prior	 3	 years.	 That	 is,	 we	 do	 not	 have	 a	 precise	 measure	 of	 an	
innovation	and	the	choice	of	IP	for	that	innovation,	only	broad	firm‐level	indicators.		
Another	limitation	of	this	analysis,	which	we	share	with	most	studies	using	innovation	
data,	 is	 that	 it	 is	 conducted	at	 the	enterprise	 level,	 so	 that	we	cannot	be	sure	 that	 the	
answers	 to	 the	 questions	 on	 methods	 of	 IP	 protection	 are	 directly	 related	 to	 the	
innovation(s)	 identified	 by	 the	 firm	 as	 introduced	 during	 the	 preceding	 three	 years.	
Thus	our	data	and	our	results	are	 likely	 to	contain	considerable	noise.	 In	general	 this	
will	weaken	rather	than	strengthen	the	results,	especially	for	the	larger	firms	that	have	
many	activities.		
Nor	do	we	have	an	indicator	of	the	quality	of	the	innovation.	This	means	that	our	finding	
of	 higher	 productivity	when	 innovating	 firms	 favour	 formal	 IP	protection	may	 reflect	
the	fact	that	firms	with	high	quality	innovations	leading	to	higher	productivity	are	also	
those	 more	 likely	 to	 use	 formal	 IP.	 The	 precise	 interpretation	 of	 our	 result	 matters,	
because	 if	 the	 formal	 IP‐productivity	 relationship	 is	due	 to	higher	quality,	 there	 is	no	
implication	that	firms	should	shift	to	using	formal	IP,	whereas	if	protecting	any	type	of	
innovation	with	 formal	 IP	 increases	productivity,	 there	would	be	 such	an	 implication.	
We	leave	the	resolution	of	this	conundrum	to	future	work.		
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Appendix	A:	Construction	of	the	dataset	
For	 this	 study	 we	 have	 constructed	 an	 ad	 hoc	 dataset	 by	 using	 the	 following	 five	
components	 available	 at	 the	 SecureLab,	 UK	 Data	 Service.	 These	 are	 all	 linked	 by	 the	
unique	reporting	unit	number:	
Business	 Structure	 Database	 (BSD):	 the	 dataset	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 Inter	
Departmental	 Business	 Register	 (IDBR)	 and	 provides	 longitudinal	 business	
demography	information	for	the	population	of	businesses	in	the	UK.	We	use	information	
on	 a	 company’s	 industrial	 classification	 (SIC	92)	 as	well	 as	 incorporation	 and	market	
exit	dates	from	the	BSD	to	be	able	to	define	the	age	of	the	firm.13		
Annual	Respondents	Database	(ARD2):	the	ARD2	is	constructed	from	the	microdata	
collected	 in	 the	 Annual	 Business	 Inquiry	 (ABI)	 conducted	 by	 the	 ONS.	 The	 stratified	
survey	 sample	 is	 drawn	 from	 the	 IDBR.14	 The	 ARD	 covers	 both	 the	 production	
(including	manufacturing)	and	the	non‐production	sector	(services).	However	the	time	
series	dimension	varies	across	the	twos:	while	for	the	production	sector	it	is	possible	to	
have	information	available	up	to	1980	(and	early	70s	for	some	industries),	the	data	for	
the	services	sector	is	available	only	after	1997.	The	information	is	assembled	from	the	
replies	to	the	Census	forms:	as	this	is	a	mandatory	requirement	for	UK‐based	business,	
the	response	rates	to	the	ARD	are	rather	high	and	this	makes	it	highly	representative	of	
the	underlying	population.	Each	establishment	has	got	a	unique	reference	number	that	
does	not	change	over	 time	and	so	allows	us	 to	build	up	a	panel	dataset.	The	ARD	 is	a	
stratified	 random	 sample	 where	 sampling	 probabilities	 are	 higher	 for	 large	
establishments:	indeed	for	establishments	with	more	than	250	employees,	the	sampling	
probability	 is	 equal	 to	 one.	 The	 ARD	 contains	 all	 the	 basic	 information	 (namely	 the	
inputs	 and	 output	 variables)	 needed	 to	 estimate	 the	 production	 function.	 Output	 is	
measured	by	the	deflated	added	value.	Employment	is	measured	by	the	total	number	of	
																																																								
13 The definition of market exit is problematic. It is not possible to identify whether a firm has ceased trading or 
if it has merely undergone a change in structure that leads to its original reference number becoming extinct. 
14 The stratification sample weights are as follows: businesses with (a) <10 employees 0.25, (b) 10-99 
employees 0.5, (c) 100-249 employees all or ≥ 0.5 depending on industry, and (d) >250 employees all. 
Moreover, if a firm with <10 employees is sampled once, it is not sampled again for at least three years. 
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employees.	As	for	capital,	it	is	well	known	that	the	ARD	does	not	contain	information	on	
capital	 stock.	However,	 stock	of	 capital	has	been	 constructed	at	 the	ONS	by	using	 the	
perpetual	inventory	method.		
UK	Community	Innovation	Survey	(CIS)	3,	4,	and	5:	the	CIS	is	a	stratified	sample	of	
firms	with	more	 than	10	 employees	 drawn	 from	 the	 IDBR.	 The	 CIS	 contains	 detailed	
information	on	 firms’	 self‐reported	 innovative	activities.	This	covers	 firms’	 innovation	
activities	over	a	three‐year	window	targeting	firms	with	more	than	ten	employees.	The	
CIS	 is	a	survey	carried	out	by	national	statistical	agencies	 in	all	25	EU	member	states	
under	the	coordination	of	Eurostat.	The	sampling	frame	for	the	UK	CIS	was	developed	
from	the	Interdepartmental	Business	Register	(IDBR)	with	the	survey	being	conducted	
by	post.	Firms	are	asked	whether	they	have	produced	any	innovation	in	the	reference	
period	(i.e.	the	three	years	before	the	survey	starts)	and	if	so,	what	type	of	 innovation	
they	 have	 introduced.	 In	 turn	 innovation	 can	 be	 of	 three	 types:	 product	 innovation,	
process	innovation	and	wider	(or	organisational)	innovation.	Unsurprisingly,	firms	can	
be	 simultaneously	 produce	 two	 type	 of	 innovations	 (or	 even	 three	 types)	 and	 this	
allows	 us	 to	 construct	 our	 dependent	 variable	 as	 the	 total	 number	 of	 innovations	
produced	by	a	firm	over	the	period	2005‐07.	This	variable	can	then	vary	between	0	(as	
firms	 may	 not	 produce	 any	 innovation	 in	 the	 reference	 period	 and	 therefore	 are	
recorded	as	non‐innovators)	and	3	(if	firms	produced	a	product,	a	process	and	a	wider	
innovation	at	the	same	time).	The	CIS	provides	information	on	what	external	sources	of	
information	a	firm	uses	and	whether	it	collaborates	with	other	organisations	to	develop	
innovation.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Survey	 contains	 information	 on	 R&D	 expenditure,	 the	
proportion	 of	 the	 workforce	 with	 a	 degree	 in	 engineering	 or	 a	 science	 subject	 and	
whether	or	not	the	plant	is	part	of	a	group.	We	use	three	surveys:	CIS	3	which	covers	the	
period	1998‐2000,	CIS	4	which	covers	2002‐2004,	and	CIS	5	which	covers	2004‐2006.	
The	 sample	 frames	 differ	 for	 the	 three	 CIS	waves	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 size	 and	 industry	
coverage.	 For	 CIS	 3,	 the	 sample	 frame	 consists	 of	 19,625	 enterprises	with	 responses	
from	 8,172	 enterprises	 (42%	 response	 rate);	 CIS	 3	 covers	 both	 production	
(manufacturing,	mining,	 electricity,	 gas	 and	water,	 construction)	 and	 services	 sectors	
whereas	the	retail	sector	has	been	excluded.	CIS	4	has	the	largest	sample	size	out	of	the	
three	CIS	waves	with	a	sample	frame	of	28,355	enterprises	and	responses	from	16,446	
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enterprises	 (58%	 response	 rate);	 it	 also	 includes	 the	 following	 sectors:	 sale,	
maintenance	&	 repair	of	motor	vehicles	 (SIC	50);	Retail	Trade	 (SIC	52);	 and	Hotels	&	
restaurants	 (SIC	 55).	 CIS	 5	 was	 answered	 by	 14,872	 firms	 which	 correspond	 to	 a	
response	rate	of	53%	(Robson	and	Haigh,	2008).	It	covers	the	same	industries	as	CIS	4	
with	 the	addition	of	SIC	921	(motion	picture	and	video	activities)	and	922	(radio	and	
television	activities).		
	
	
	 	
Observations Firms
Total CIS observations 68,112 46,638
Not matched to ARD 20,005
ARD‐CIS match 48,107
Drop missing industries, primary inds, inds 80‐98 26,092
Drop non‐profits, government, missing legal status 519
Unable to construct capital stock 5,040
Potential CIS sample 16,456 11,421
Missing employment on CIS 1,049
Large estimation sample 15,407 10,844
Missing capital, turnover, or materials 3,761
Trim ratios for production function at 1% 796
Estimation sample 10,850 7,255
CIS 6 and 7 sample 3,706 3,068
CIS 3,4,5 sample 7,144 5,553
Table A1: Choosing the sample
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SIC Description Total Large SMEs Large SMEs
23‐25, ex 
244,245 Mfg of chemical, rubber, plastic, oil 445 267 178 60.0% 40.0%
30, 32 Mfg of computers & electronic inst 156 80 76 51.3% 48.7%
31 Mfg of elec equipment 192 92 100 47.9% 52.1%
28 Mfg of fabricated metal goods 318 117 201 36.8% 63.2%
15,16 Mfg of food, beverage, and tobacco 713 500 213 70.1% 29.9%
33 Mfg of medical & scientific inst 171 92 79 53.8% 46.2%
17‐19, 36 Mfg of misc low‐tech goods 502 237 265 47.2% 52.8%
34 Mfg of motor vehicales 294 176 118 59.9% 40.1%
29 Mfg of non‐elec machinery 413 239 174 57.9% 42.1%
35 Mfg of other transport equipment 188 98 90 52.1% 47.9%
244 Mfg of pharmaceuticals 57 47 10 82.5% 17.5%
26, 27 Mfg of primary metals 301 153 148 50.8% 49.2%
22 Mfg of printed goods 285 202 83 70.9% 29.1%
245 Mfg of soap & toiletries 61 46 15 75.4% 24.6%
20, 21 Mfg of wood & furniture 243 97 146 39.9% 60.1%
Total manufacturing 4339 2443 1896 56.3% 43.7%
45 Construction 803 413 390 51.4% 48.6%
64 Post, telephone, and telegraph 148 85 63 57.4% 42.6%
37,40,41,90 Utility services 134 68 66 50.7% 49.3%
50‐52 Wholesale & retail trade 2077 1372 705 66.1% 33.9%
Total utilites & trade 3162 1938 1224 61.3% 38.7%
72 Computer services 206 125 81 60.7% 39.3%
65‐70 Financial, insurance, real estate 286 181 105 63.3% 36.7%
55 Hotel & restaurant services 499 401 98 80.4% 19.6%
71 Leasing services 163 72 91 44.2% 55.8%
52, 74 Other business services 1394 932 462 66.9% 33.1%
73 R&D services 76 49 27 64.5% 35.5%
60‐63 Transportation services 725 455 270 62.8% 37.2%
Total services 3349 2215 1134 66.1% 33.9%
Total 10850 6596 4254 60.8% 39.2%
Table A2: Sectoral breakdown 1998‐2010
Number of observations Share
Variable Median IQ range Median IQ range Median IQ range
Observations
Number of employees 305 627.5 353.5 763 315 607
Turnover* 25000 71327 35811 89629 27385 73283
Value added* 8951 21916 11729 25951 9748 22167
Capital* 5002 15407 7572 19522 5661 16315
Purchased goods & services* 12014 39102 18794 42940 13490 39168
Output‐employee ratio* 85.87 93.85 94.82 87.81 89.52 93.68
Output‐capital ratio 5.22 10.49 4.69 8.30 5.02 10.21
Output‐materials ratio 1.80 2.25 1.75 1.87 1.76 2.19
Capital per employee* 17.17 31.97 20.72 34.95 18.48 32.92
R&D ‐turnover ratio 0.0000 0.0004 0.0025 0.0092 0.0000 0.0024
Innovation spend ‐turnover ratio 0.0019 0.0155 0.0142 0.0380 0.0104 0.0290
R&D per employee* 0.000 0.036 0.246 0.942 0.000 0.234
Innovation spend per employee* 0.158 1.421 1.333 3.728 0.915 2.663
Age in 2011 in years 28 18 29 17 28 18
Importance of formal IP in the 3‐digit sector 0.35 0.33 0.44 0.28 0.38 0.35
Importance of informal IP in the 3‐digit sector 0.40 0.36 0.59 0.31 0.48 0.36
Perception of market risk in the 3‐digit sector 0.37 0.34 0.40 0.24 0.38 0.29
Perception of financial constraints in the 3‐d sector 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.22 0.34 0.25
Importance of regulation & standards in the 3‐digit sector 0.33 0.32 0.39 0.25 0.36 0.31
Importance of environmental, H&S regs. in the 3‐digit sector 0.29 0.29 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.32
* Units are 1000s of GBP.
Inn. spend firms
4,414
Table 1: Estimation sample ‐ CIS 3, 4, 5 matched to BSD (2000‐2006)
7,144 2,162
All observations R&D firms
Variable
All 
observations R&D firms
Innov. spend 
firms
D (formal IP of med or high importance) 35.1% 62.3% 46.7%
D (informal IP of med or high importance) 44.8% 77.3% 60.7%
D (foreign ownership) 25.0% 29.4% 26.3%
D (export status) 48.1% 70.6% 57.0%
D (market risk) 43.2% 55.6% 50.0%
D (financial constraints) 39.5% 46.2% 44.5%
D (innov to improve range)  39.2% 64.8% 52.0%
D (innov for new markets)  40.8% 66.6% 54.1%
D (innov for quality improvement)  47.3% 73.7% 62.4%
D (innov to increase flexibility)  37.1% 57.6% 49.0%
D (innov to increase capacity) 34.2% 52.3% 45.3%
D (innov to reduce unit cost)  37.2% 59.9% 49.3%
D (innov to meet regulations or standards)  34.3% 50.7% 43.7%
D (innov for environment or health&safety) 31.0% 49.0% 40.3%
D  (collaborates) 19.2% 37.0% 26.4%
D (within group important info source) 58.4% 91.4% 78.3%
D (suppliers important info source) 52.7% 75.2% 70.1%
D (customers important info source) 55.9% 83.4% 73.7%
D (competitors important info source) 41.9% 62.0% 54.8%
D (universities important info source) 10.3% 20.8% 14.1%
D (product imitator only) 11.0% 19.6% 15.8%
D (product innovator) 33.4% 63.0% 47.1%
D (new‐to‐market product innovator) 22.4% 43.4% 31.3%
D (process imitator only) 19.2% 32.1% 26.8%
D (process innovator) 26.4% 46.8% 37.2%
D (new‐to‐market process innovator) 7.2% 14.7% 10.4%
Table 1 (cont.): Dummy variable means
All SME Large
Manu‐
facturing
Services & 
other
Acquisition of mach. & comp. hardware/software 45.1% 48.0% 43.0% 43.2% 47.0%
Internal R&D spending 18.6% 17.7% 19.2% 25.1% 12.0%
Marketing expense 13.5% 11.8% 14.9% 10.6% 16.5%
Training expense 9.5% 10.2% 8.9% 5.4% 13.4%
Design expense 6.4% 5.9% 6.8% 8.8% 4.2%
External R&D spending 3.7% 3.5% 3.9% 4.2% 3.2%
Acquisition of external knowledge 3.2% 2.9% 3.4% 2.6% 3.7%
Observations with nonzero spending 4,414 1,876 2,538 2,199 2,215
Share with nonzero spending 61.8% 57.1% 65.8% 71.1% 54.7%
The shares shown are for firms that have some form of innovation spending reported.
Table 2: Average composition of innovation expenditure
Dependent variable
Coefficient
Marginal 
Effects Coefficient
Marginal 
Effects
Log (number of employees) 0.073 0.013 *** ‐0.230 0.033 *** 0.024 0.011 * ‐0.263 0.021 ***
Log (firm age in 2011) 0.011 0.056 ‐0.202 0.108 ‐0.077 0.051 ‐0.052 0.072
D (foreign ownership) ‐0.097 0.046 * 0.320 0.087 *** ‐0.071 0.043 0.291 0.061 ***
D (export status) 0.314 0.045 *** 0.651 0.096 *** 0.163 0.042 *** 0.418 0.060 ***
D (collaborates) 0.415 0.047 *** 0.475 0.091 *** 0.272 0.055 *** 0.393 0.057 ***
Importance of formal IP in the 3‐digit sector 0.256 0.170   1.050 0.299 *** ‐0.284 0.165 0.351 0.212
Importance of informal IP in the 3‐digit sector 0.242 0.188   0.637 0.315 * 0.378 0.183 * 0.710 0.231 ***
Perception of market risk in the 3‐digit sector 0.348 0.182   0.017 0.292 0.156 0.175 ‐0.017 0.212
Perception of financial constraints in the 3‐digit 
sector ‐0.290 0.171   ‐0.256 0.284 ‐0.218 0.166 0.224 0.198
Importance of regulation & standards in the 3‐
digit sector 0.016 0.198 0.427 0.354 0.127 0.197 0.150 0.250
Importance of environmental, health & safety 
regs. in the 3‐digit sector ‐0.037 0.186   ‐0.296 0.347   0.059 0.185 ‐0.002 0.243
D (within group important info source) 1.026 0.059 *** 0.859 0.195 *** 0.790 0.045 *** 0.292 0.077 ***
D (suppliers important info source) 0.044 0.048 ‐0.279 0.086 ** 0.493 0.042 *** 0.326 0.060 ***
D (customers important info source) 0.305 0.056 *** 0.392 0.112 *** 0.401 0.049 *** 0.145 0.068 *
D (competitors important info source) ‐0.072 0.046 0.055 0.081 ‐0.026 0.048 0.169 0.055 **
D (universities important info source) 0.307 0.061 *** 0.410 0.097 *** 0.050 0.074 0.238 0.071 ***
Year Dummies
Two‐digit sector dummies
Correlation of the disturbances in the two equations 0.349 0.101 ** 0.064 0.043
Standard error of log R&D per employee residual 1.637 0.046 *** 1.576 0.019 ***
Log likelihood
Wald test for model (d.f.)
Observations (nonzero share)
Standard Errors robsut to heteroskedasticity, clustered by enterprise
The method of estimation is maximum likelihood on a generalized Tobit model.
1082.7 (43)***
7144 (62%)
39.5 (0.000)*** 2.4 (0.295)
34.7 (0.093)* 163.2 (0.000)***
‐11696.9
Invests in R&D (1/0) Log (R&D/employee)
Standard Errors Standard Errors
Table 3: Sample selection estimates ‐ Investment in R&D or Innovation and its intensity
Invests in innov (1/0) Log (IS/employee)
Standard Errors Standard Errors
51.8 (0.000)***
101.6 (0.000)***
3.2 (0.206)
181.8 (0.000)***
7,144 (30%)
‐7097.7
914.7 (43)***
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Log (predicted R&D per employee) 0.843 0.045 *** 0.638 0.044 *** 0.304 0.046 ***
Log (n of employees) 0.321 0.016 *** 0.229 0.015 *** 0.116 0.015 ***
Log (firm age in 2011) 0.132 0.054 * 0.114 0.053 * ‐0.057 0.057
D (collaborates) ‐0.191 0.052 *** ‐0.026 0.054 0.428 0.053 ***
Firm perception of market risk 0.324 0.043 *** 0.366 0.044 *** 0.172 0.044 ***
Firm perception of fin. Constraints 0.123 0.043 ** 0.293 0.044 *** 0.018 0.044
Firm ‐ impt. of reg & standards 0.140 0.050 ** 0.121 0.052 * ‐0.118 0.053 *
Firm ‐ impt. of env, H&S regs 0.052 0.051 0.160 0.054 ** ‐0.023 0.054
D (innov to improve range)  0.704 0.051 ***
D (innov for new markets)  0.234 0.054 ***
D (innov for quality improvement)  0.266 0.058 ***
D (within group impt info source) ‐0.234 0.066 *** 0.096 0.064 0.311 0.068 ***
D (suppliers important info source) 0.289 0.047 *** 0.415 0.047 *** 0.123 0.051 *
D (customers impt info source) ‐0.127 0.054 * 0.140 0.053 ** 0.139 0.058 *
D (competitors impt info source) 0.173 0.045 *** 0.130 0.045 ** ‐0.113 0.047 *
D (universities impt info source) 0.058 0.064 0.049 0.071 ‐0.080 0.066
D (imitator) ‐0.270 0.060 *** ‐0.266 0.064 ***
Year dummies (2)
Two‐digit sector dummies (25)
Wald test for model (d.f.)
Corr (formal IP, informal IP) 0.548 0.019 ***
Corr (formal IP, innovation) 0.197 0.026 ***
Corr (informal IP, innovation) 0.236 0.026 ***
Note: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood on a trivariate probit model. Standard Errors are clustered around the enterprise
Table 4a. Multivariate Probit estimates of IP choice and product innovation
7,144 observations on 5,684 firms; Log likelihood = ‐8967.1
Formal IP methods Informal IP methods
Product Innovator or 
imitator
Std. err Std. err Std. err
5,322.1 (125)***
298.2 (0.000)***
65.4 (0.000)*** 80.1 (0.000)*** 1.5 (0.464)
105.4 (0.000)*** 52.9 (0.000)***
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Log (predicted R&D per employee) 0.843 0.045 *** 0.636 0.044 *** 0.100 0.046 *
Log (n of employees) 0.321 0.016 *** 0.228 0.015 *** 0.085 0.016 ***
Log (firm age in 2011) 0.136 0.055 * 0.116 0.053 * 0.015 0.057
D (collaborates) ‐0.201 0.052 *** ‐0.038 0.054 0.573 0.052 ***
Firm perception of market risk 0.322 0.043 *** 0.365 0.044 *** 0.119 0.044 **
Firm perception of fin. Constraints 0.121 0.043 ** 0.292 0.044 *** 0.016 0.043
Firm ‐ impt. of reg & standards 0.144 0.050 ** 0.122 0.052 * ‐0.183 0.053 ***
Firm ‐ impt. of env, H&S regs 0.046 0.051 0.157 0.054 ** 0.161 0.054 **
D (innov to increase flexibility)  0.480 0.055 ***
D (innov to increase capacity) 0.408 0.053 ***
D (innov to reduce unit cost)  0.180 0.054 ***
D (within group impt info source) ‐0.240 0.066 *** 0.089 0.064 0.471 0.072 ***
D (suppliers important info source) 0.287 0.047 *** 0.413 0.047 *** 0.319 0.051 ***
D (customers impt info source) ‐0.136 0.055 * 0.129 0.053 * 0.032 0.059  
D (competitors impt info source) 0.169 0.045 *** 0.129 0.045 ** ‐0.109 0.047 *
D (universities impt info source) 0.068 0.064 0.066 0.071 ‐0.113 0.064
D (imitator) ‐0.084 0.056 ‐0.054 0.064
Year dummies (2)
Two‐digit sector dummies (25)
Wald test for model (d.f.)
Corr (formal IP, informal IP) 0.547 0.019 ***
Corr (formal IP, innovation) 0.039 0.024
Corr (informal IP, innovation) 0.125 0.024 ***
Note: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood on a trivariate probit model. Standard Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and 
clustered on enterprise.
Table 4b. Multivariate Probit estimates of IP choice and process innovation
7,144 observations on 5,684 firms; Log likelihood = ‐8,959.6
Formal IP methods Informal IP methods
Process Innovator or 
imitator
Std. err Std. err Std. err
65.4 (0.000)*** 80.1 (0.000)*** 21.1 (0.000)***
298.2 (0.000)*** 105.4 (0.000)*** 45.2 (0.000)***
5,115.5 (125)***
Dependent variable
Type of innovation
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Log (n of employees) 0.664 0.011 *** 0.664 0.011 *** 0.663 0.011 *** 0.664 0.011 ***
Log (capital) 0.096 0.007 *** 0.097 0.007 *** 0.096 0.007 *** 0.096 0.007 ***
Log (materials) 0.276 0.010 *** 0.277 0.010 *** 0.276 0.010 *** 0.277 0.010 ***
Scale coefficient# 1.036 0.006 *** 1.038 0.006 *** 1.035 0.006 *** 1.037 0.006 ***
Predicted prob of innovation 0.000 0.050 ‐0.105 0.056 0.054 0.069 ‐0.256 0.180
D (formal IP important)*Pred P of innov ‐0.007 0.038   ‐0.012 0.034 0.022 0.032   0.013 0.027
D (informal IP important)*Pred P of innov 0.028 0.034 0.035 0.032 0.025 0.029 0.030 0.025
D (formal IP important) 0.121 0.066   0.191 0.076 * 0.077 0.075   0.416 0.186 *
D (informal IP important) ‐0.006 0.070 0.019 0.080 ‐0.020 0.083 0.088 0.216
Prob innov and formal IP 0.114 0.055 ** 0.074 0.068 0.153 0.075 ** 0.173 0.216
Prob innov and informal IP 0.022 0.041 ‐0.051 0.051 0.059 0.054 ‐0.138 0.157
Prob innov and both 0.136 0.031 *** 0.128 0.029 *** 0.158 0.038 *** 0.291 0.105 ***
F‐test for 4 IP variables
F‐test for 2 survey dummies
F‐test for 25 industry dummies
F‐test for model (df=35)
R‐squared
SSR
Standard error
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered on firm.
Shaded coefficients are derived from the estimated coefficients.
7,144 observations on 5,684 firms.
# Test is for the scale coefficient equal to unity
Std. err Std. err Std. err Std. err
Table 5. OLS Estimates of the production function
New‐to‐market product 
innovation
New‐to‐market process 
innovation
Log (turnover)
Product innovation Process innovation
3.6 (0.009)***
36.0 (0.000)***
22.1 (0.000)***
1360.9 (0.000)***
6.6 (0.009)***
22.3 (0.000)***
2.6 (0.037)** 5.6 (0.009)***
34.2 (0.000)*** 35.6 (0.000)*** 34.0 (0.000)***
21.8 (0.000)*** 22.0 (0.000)***
1357.5 (0.000)*** 1357.7 (0.000)*** 1357.2 (0.000)***
0.902
2,572.9
0.602
0.902 0.902 0.902
2,571.7 2,573.4 2,572.4
0.602 0.602 0.602
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Log (predicted IS per employee) 1.026 0.065 *** 0.945 0.063 *** 0.453 0.066 ***
Log (n of employees) 0.399 0.020 *** 0.329 0.019 *** 0.165 0.020 ***
Log (firm age in 2011) 0.028 0.053   0.042 0.053   ‐0.092 0.056
D (collaborates) ‐0.182 0.054 *** ‐0.093 0.056 0.395 0.055 ***
Firm perception of market risk 0.331 0.043 *** 0.373 0.044 *** 0.175 0.044 ***
Firm perception of fin. Constraints 0.092 0.042 * 0.270 0.044 *** 0.007 0.044
Firm ‐ impt. of reg & standards 0.151 0.050 ** 0.131 0.052 * ‐0.114 0.053 *
Firm ‐ impt. of env, H&S regs 0.030 0.051 0.142 0.054 ** ‐0.031 0.054
D (innov to improve range)  0.704 0.051 ***
D (innov for new markets)  0.234 0.054 ***
D (innov for quality improvement)  0.266 0.058 ***
D (within group impt info source) 0.204 0.055 *** 0.372 0.054 0.441 0.058 ***
D (suppliers important info source) ‐0.288 0.048 *** ‐0.067 0.048   ‐0.108 0.051 *
D (customers impt info source) 0.054 0.052   0.250 0.051 *** 0.191 0.056 ***
D (competitors impt info source) 0.048 0.046   0.007 0.046   ‐0.173 0.049 ***
D (universities impt info source) 0.167 0.062 ** 0.086 0.070 ‐0.063 0.065
D (imitator) ‐0.282 0.059 *** ‐0.275 0.064 ***
Year dummies (2)
Two‐digit sector dummies (25)
Wald test for model (d.f.)
Corr (formal IP, informal IP) 0.553 0.019 ***
Corr (formal IP, innovation) 0.202 0.026 ***
Corr (informal IP, innovation) 0.237 0.026 ***
5,269.2 (125)***
Note: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood on a trivariate probit model. Standard Errors are clustered around the enterprise
65.4 (0.000)*** 80.1 (0.000)*** 1.5 (0.464)
298.2 (0.000)*** 105.4 (0.000)*** 52.9 (0.000)***
Std. err Std. err Std. err
Table 6a. Multivariate Probit estimates of IP choice and product innovation
7,144 observations on 5,684 firms; Log likelihood = ‐9,005.1
Formal IP methods Informal IP methods
Product Innovator or 
imitator
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Log (predicted IS per employee) 1.025 0.065 *** 0.936 0.064 *** 0.139 0.066 *
Log (n of employees) 0.400 0.020 *** 0.327 0.020 *** 0.098 0.021 ***
Log (firm age in 2011) 0.036 0.054   0.045 0.053   0.002 0.056
D (collaborates) ‐0.172 0.054 ** ‐0.110 0.057 0.567 0.054 ***
Firm perception of market risk 0.336 0.043 *** 0.371 0.044 *** 0.120 0.044 **
Firm perception of fin. Constraints 0.090 0.042 * 0.267 0.044 *** 0.012 0.043
Firm ‐ impt. of reg & standards 0.153 0.050 ** 0.133 0.052 * ‐0.183 0.054 ***
Firm ‐ impt. of env, H&S regs 0.042 0.051 0.133 0.054 * 0.159 0.056 **
D (innov to increase flexibility)  0.482 0.056 ***
D (innov to increase capacity) 0.410 0.053 ***
D (innov to reduce unit cost)  0.176 0.054 ***
D (within group impt info source) 0.213 0.056 *** 0.358 0.054 *** 0.516 0.062 ***
D (suppliers important info source) ‐0.271 0.048 *** ‐0.070 0.048   0.247 0.052 ***
D (customers impt info source) 0.041 0.052   0.237 0.051 *** 0.049 0.057  
D (competitors impt info source) 0.041 0.046   0.008 0.046   ‐0.127 0.049 **
D (universities impt info source) 0.169 0.063 ** 0.110 0.071 ‐0.104 0.063
D (imitator) ‐0.197 0.061 *** 0.042 0.065
Year dummies (2)
Two‐digit sector dummies (25)
Wald test for model (d.f.)
Corr (formal IP, informal IP) 0.556 0.018 ***
Corr (formal IP, innovation) 0.105 0.032 ***
Corr (informal IP, innovation) 0.118 0.033 ***
5,042.8 (125)***
Note: The method of estimation is maximum likelihood on a trivariate probit model. Standard Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and 
clustered on enterprise.
65.4 (0.000)*** 80.1 (0.000)*** 21.1 (0.000)***
298.2 (0.000)*** 105.4 (0.000)*** 45.2 (0.000)***
Std. err Std. err Std. err
Table 6b. Multivariate Probit estimates of IP choice and process innovation
7,144 observations on 5,684 firms; Log likelihood = ‐8,994.8
Formal IP methods Informal IP methods
Process Innovator or 
imitator
Dependent variable
Type of innovation
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Log (n of employees) 0.664 0.011 *** 0.664 0.011 *** 0.663 0.011 *** 0.664 0.011 ***
Log (capital) 0.096 0.007 *** 0.097 0.007 *** 0.096 0.007 *** 0.096 0.007 ***
Log (materials) 0.276 0.010 *** 0.277 0.010 *** 0.276 0.010 *** 0.277 0.010 ***
Scale coefficient# 1.036 0.006 *** 1.038 0.006 *** 1.035 0.006 *** 1.037 0.006 ***
Predicted prob of innovation 0.003 0.051 ‐0.107 0.056 0.048 0.069 ‐0.282 0.180
D (formal IP important)*Pred P of innov ‐0.009 0.037   ‐0.013 0.034 0.019 0.032   0.012 0.027
D (informal IP important)*Pred P of innov 0.028 0.034 0.035 0.032 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.025
D (formal IP important) 0.126 0.066   0.194 0.076 * 0.088 0.075   0.433 0.186 *
D (informal IP important) ‐0.008 0.070 0.020 0.080 ‐0.022 0.084 0.093 0.216
Prob innov and formal IP 0.120 0.056 ** 0.074 0.068 0.155 0.076 ** 0.163 0.216
Prob innov and informal IP 0.023 0.041 ‐0.052 0.051 0.052 0.054 ‐0.159 0.156
Prob innov and both 0.140 0.031 *** 0.129 0.031 *** 0.159 0.038 *** 0.286 0.105 ***
F‐test for 4 IP variables
F‐test for 2 survey dummies
F‐test for 25 industry dummies
F‐test for model (df=35)
R‐squared
SSR
Standard error
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered on firm.
Shaded coefficients are derived from the estimated coefficients.
7,144 observations on 5,684 firms.
# Test is for the scale coefficient equal to unity
2,572.7 2,571.6 2,573.4 2,572.2
0.602 0.601 0.602 0.602
1361.4 (0.000)*** 1357.6 (0.000)*** 1357.7 (0.000)*** 1357.2 (0.000)***
0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902
36.0 (0.000)*** 34.2 (0.000)*** 35.5 (0.000)*** 33.7 (0.000)***
22.1 (0.000)*** 22.3 (0.000)*** 21.7 (0.000)*** 22.1 (0.000)***
Std. err Std. err Std. err Std. err
3.7 (0.006)*** 6.7 (0.009)*** 2.7 (0.027)** 5.9 (0.000)***
Table 7. OLS Estimates of the production function ‐ innovation spending model
Log (turnover)
Product innovation Process innovation
New‐to‐market product 
innovation
New‐to‐market process 
innovation
Dependent variable
Type of innovation
Log (capital) 0.115 0.009 *** 0.069 0.011 *** 3.24 *** 0.116 0.009 *** 0.069 0.011 *** 3.31 ***
Log (n of employees) 0.705 0.018 *** 0.686 0.016 *** ‐0.79   0.707 0.018 *** 0.686 0.016 *** ‐0.87
Log (materials) 0.236 0.012 *** 0.361 0.016 *** 6.25 *** 0.237 0.012 *** 0.362 0.016 *** 6.25 ***
Prob innovation 0.006 0.074 0.075 0.065 0.70 ‐0.157 0.081 0.030 0.072 1.73 *
Prob innov and formal IP 0.162 0.083 ** 0.111 0.070 ‐0.47 ‐0.027 0.109 0.131 0.083 1.15
Prob innov and informal IP ‐0.067 0.057 0.115 0.055 ** 2.30 ** ‐0.122 0.073 * 0.047 0.065 1.73 *
Prob innov and both 0.095 0.048 ** 0.151 0.040 *** 0.90   0.008 0.067 0.148 0.046 *** 1.72 *
F‐test for 4 IP variables
SSR
Standard error
Observations (firms)
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered on firm.
SMEs are firms with employment less than 250.
# The t‐test is for the equality of the coefficient between manufacturing and services. 
F test for difference of process models = 10.4
3,285 (3,022) 3,859 (2,831)
Table 8: Estimates of the production function by firm size
1,220.0 1,225.3
0.613 0.566
3,285 (3,022) 3,859 (2,831)
3.2 (0.011)** 1.6 (0.184)
SMEs Large firms SMEs
0.613 0.566
1,220.8 1,224.5
F test for difference of product models = 10.5
Log (turnover)
2.8 (0.027)** 0.8 (0.554)
Product Process
T‐test#Large firmsT‐test#
Dependent variable
Type of innovation
Log (capital) 0.027 0.010 *** 0.134 0.009 *** 7.95 *** 0.028 0.010 *** 0.134 0.010 *** 7.50 ***
Log (n of employees) 0.764 0.016 *** 0.587 0.014 *** 8.33 *** 0.765 0.016 *** 0.587 0.014 *** 8.37 ***
Log (materials) 0.334 0.017 *** 0.266 0.012 *** ‐3.27 *** 0.333 0.016 *** 0.266 0.012 *** ‐3.35 ***
Prob innovation ‐0.164 0.058 ** 0.117 0.077 2.91 *** ‐0.297 0.066 *** 0.067 0.086 3.36 ***
Prob innov and formal IP ‐0.086 0.061 0.254 0.096 *** 2.99 *** ‐0.176 0.073 ** 0.299 0.121 ** 3.36 ***
Prob innov and informal IP ‐0.093 0.047 ** 0.076 0.069 2.02 *** ‐0.171 0.056 *** 0.042 0.087 2.06 ***
Prob innov and both ‐0.015 0.035 0.213 0.061 *** 3.24 *** ‐0.050 0.040 0.274 0.080 *** 3.62 ***
F‐test for 4 IP variables
SSR
Standard error
Observations (firms)
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered on firm.
Services & other includes construction, trade, and utilities in addition to services.
# The t‐test is for the equality of the coefficient between manufacturing and services. 
F test for difference of product models = 9.2
F test for difference of process models = 9.4
0.481 0.658
3,091 (2,430) 4,053 (3,272) 3,091 (2,430) 4,053 (3,272)
0.482 0.658
2.8 (0.025)**
1748.2 708.7 1747.8
2.1 (0.083)* 1.9 (0.111) 3.9 (0.004)***
711.7
Table 9: Estimates of the production function by sector
Log (turnover)
Product Process
Manufacturing Services & other T‐test# Manufacturing Services & other T‐test#
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